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Abstract 
We develop a new partial equilibrium, four-region world trade model for the soybean 
complex comprising soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal. In the model, some 
consumers view genetically modified Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans and products as 
weakly inferior to conventional ones; the RR seed is patented and sold worldwide by a 
U.S. firm; and producers employ a costly segregation technology to separate 
conventional and biotech products in the supply chain. The calibrated model is solved for 
equilibrium prices, quantities, production patterns, trade flows, and welfare changes 
under different assumptions regarding regional government’s production and trade 
policies, differentiated consumer tastes, and several other demand and supply parameters. 
Incomplete adoption of RR technology naturally arises in the free trade equilibrium, with 
the United States producing both genetically modified and conventional soybeans. The 
United States, Argentina, Brazil and the Rest of the World all gain from the introduction 
of RR soybeans, although some groups of agents (producers or consumers) may lose. 
Compared to free trade with no domestic bans, a ban on RR production in the Rest of the 
World improves that region’s welfare at some levels of segregation costs but hurts the 
United States. Introduction of the same ban in Brazil benefits its farmers but makes the 
region worse off, and an import ban on RR products significantly reduces welfare of all 
agents. Price support programs for U.S. farmers, despite hurting the United States, have 
the potential to further improve the world’s efficiency. The distribution of welfare 
between consumers and producers appears to be sensitive to several parameters of the 
model, but region-level outcomes are robust with respect to most of them and are 
sensitive only to parameters defining the share of consumers conscious of genetically 
modified organisms and the elasticity of demand for conventional product varieties. 
 
Keywords: biotechnology, differentiated demand, food labeling, genetically modified 
products, identity preservation, innovations, intellectual property rights, international 
trade, loan deficiency payments, market failure, monopoly, Roundup Ready soybeans. 
 
  
 
 
 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROP INNOVATIONS AND 
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION: TRADE AND WELFARE EFFECTS 
IN THE SOYBEAN COMPLEX 
Introduction 
Biotechnology innovations in agriculture represent a recent trend that is providing both 
dazzling opportunities as well as unexpected challenges. Genetically modified (GM) crops, 
first grown commercially in 1996, already account for a major share of U.S. cultivation of 
soybeans, maize, and cotton. Whereas a few countries have followed the United States’s 
lead in this setting (notably Argentina, Canada, and China), most countries are proceeding 
very cautiously in response to considerable public opposition to this technology. The GM 
crops that have been most successful embody a single-gene transformation that makes the 
crop resistant to herbicide (e.g., Roundup Ready soybeans and Roundup Ready cotton) or 
resistant to a particular pest (e.g., Bt maize and Bt cotton). These improved crops reduce 
production costs, ceteris paribus, or increase (expected) yield. As such, they represent a 
typical process innovation, increasing the efficiency of production but not supplying any 
new attribute that consumers value per se (Moschini 2001). But consumer groups and the 
public at large have raised, especially in Europe, a vociferous opposition to the introduction 
of GM products in the food system. They have expressed concern about the safety of GM 
food and about the environmental impact of GM crops, among other things, and have de-
manded that consumers be given the “right to know” whether the food they buy contains 
GM products.1 Indeed, a number of countries are implementing mandatory labeling regula-
tions that aim at providing exactly that choice. 
An implication of this opposition is that some consumers view the new GM crops as a 
peculiar kind of product innovation, one that is bringing to market a product that is consid-
ered inferior to its traditional counterpart. This induced (and ex ante unintended) product 
differentiation that has been brought about by GM crops has a number of economic impli-
cations that need to be addressed. In particular, it is becoming clear that in order to deliver 
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the consumers’ right to choose, costly identity preservation activities are necessary to en-
sure that GM and non-GM products are segregated along the production, marketing, 
processing, and distribution chain of the food system (Bullock and Desquilbet 2002). 
Some models recently have attempted to incorporate differentiated final product de-
mands and the supply-side need to accommodate identity preservation. Whereas these 
models vary in their approaches and the issues they address (Lindner et al. 2001; Nielsen 
and Anderson 2000; Nielsen, Thierfelder, and Robinson 2001; Lence and Hayes 2001), 
they share the common attribute of being specified at a very aggregate level and of not 
modeling closely enough the characteristics of the innovation being analyzed. In particu-
lar, the GM crops that we are interested in have been developed by the private sector and 
are protected by intellectual property rights (IPRs), which give innovators a limited mo-
nopoly power that affects the pricing of GM seeds for farmers. Such market power in the 
input market should not be ignored in assessing the welfare effect of innovations (Mo-
schini and Lapan 1997). Studies that overcome some of these limitations (Moschini, 
Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000; Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson 2000) still do not ad-
dress the issue of induced product differentiation mentioned earlier. 
Two recent papers have addressed the implication of product differentiation and 
identity preservation. Desquilbet and Bullock (2001) provide preliminary analysis of po-
tential adoption of GM rapeseed with non-GM market segregation in the European 
Union. Their model, which splits the world into two regions, looks at individual consum-
ers, crop handlers, and farmers who differentiate between GM and non-GM varieties to 
build up market supply and demand functions. This approach allows the researchers to 
circumvent the problem of insufficient data for aggregate demand and supply calibra-
tions. The model is expected to be useful for answering welfare and policy questions. 
Lapan and Moschini (2001, 2002) build a two-country partial equilibrium model of an 
agricultural industry to analyze some implications of the introduction of GM products. In 
the model, one country, with consumers indifferent between GM and non-GM products, 
develops a new GM crop and adopts it. The second country, with consumers who view 
the GM crop as a product weakly inferior to the non-GM one, is the importing country (it 
does not produce the GM crop) and has the ability to impose regulations and/or protec-
tionist policies to limit its exposure to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Whereas 
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these studies take the analysis in a desired direction, the treatment is mostly theoretical 
and the need for quantitative estimates concerning the impact of GM innovations is very 
much present. 
In this study, we develop a four-region world trade model that can provide quantita-
tive answers to many economic and policy questions connected with the production of 
GM crops in a market with differentiated demands and segregation costs. The model is 
specifically tailored to the world soybean industry. In this model, the four regions pro-
duce, consume, and trade a limited number of related products. Some of these products 
exist in two varieties: conventional and GM. Producer and consumer decisions are mod-
eled explicitly in each region. In principle, demands in all regions can be differentiated, 
but for the purpose of the analysis, only one (the Rest of the World, hereafter ROW) will 
be modeled with differentiated demands. The model allows for costly identity preserva-
tion, an endogenous adoption rate of the new technology, and noncompetitively supplied 
GM seed by an innovator-monopolist residing in one of the regions (the United States). 
The model is calibrated to replicate observed data in a benchmark year, solved under both 
spatial and vertical equilibrium conditions, and simulated to analyze various policy sce-
narios of interest. The restrictions on the particular parameter values used at the 
calibration stage are also studied through an extensive sensitivity analysis.  
The questions to be addressed include the direction of price changes and trade flows 
in GM and non-GM markets, the efficiency gains from the GM crop innovation, and the 
distribution of welfare effects across regions and across agents (consumers, producers, 
and the innovator-monopolist). Also addressed is the effect of relevant government poli-
cies on both trade and welfare under different assumptions about market structure, 
differentiated consumer tastes, and other demand and supply conditions.  
 
Background 
Soybeans are one of the major oilseed crops, along with cottonseed, rapeseed (ca-
nola), and sunflower seed. Processed soybeans are the largest source of protein feed and 
vegetable oil in the world, and the United States is the world’s largest soybean producer 
and exporter (Table 1). Although the United States has maintained the leading  
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TABLE 1. Soybean production and utilization, 1998–99 (million mt) 
 Area   Net  in Direct  
 (mil ha) Yield Production Exports Stocks Use Crush 
World 71.16 2.25 161.67 NA 2.39 23.58 135.70 
United States 28.51 2.62 74.60 21.82 4.05 5.47 43.26 
South America 22.93 2.41 55.34 12.89 -0.27 2.43 40.29 
   Argentina 8.17 2.45 20.00 2.70 -0.16 0.66 16.80 
   Brazil 12.90 2.43 31.30 8.27 -0.09 1.52 21.60 
   Paraguay 1.20 2.50 3.00 2.30 0.00 0.05 0.65 
Rest of the World 19.72 1.61 31.73 -34.71 -1.39 15.68 52.15 
   European Union 0.52 2.95 1.53 -16.07 -0.16 1.53 16.23 
   China 8.50 1.78 15.16 -3.66 -1.11 7.32 12.61 
   Japan 0.11 1.45 0.15 -4.81 -0.02 1.28 3.70 
   Mexico 0.09 1.59 0.14 -3.76 -0.08 0.03 3.95 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 2002a. 
 
position in the world soybean markets, its share of global soybean and soybean product 
exports has steadily diminished in the past two decades. One of the reasons for this de-
cline is the emergence of South America, particularly Brazil and Argentina, as a very 
strong soybean producing region (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). In the 1998–99 
crop year, Brazil produced 31 million metric tons (mt) of soybeans, Argentina produced 
20 million mt, and the United States produced almost 75 million mt. Brazil and Argentina 
represent more than 90 percent of South America’s soybean production, with Paraguay 
producing 75 percent of the remaining volume. 
Only a small share of U.S., Brazilian, and Argentine soybean production is con-
sumed directly (as seed, on-farm dairy feed, or direct food uses such as tofu). A larger 
share is exported to the ROW consisting of the European Union, China, Japan, Mexico, 
and other, smaller importing countries, with the European Union being the world’s single 
largest soybean importer. Soybeans primarily are crushed to extract the soybean oil and 
meal (which also are actively traded internationally).  
Soybean oil constitutes approximately 18 to 19 percent of the soybean’s weight and 
has both food and industrial uses. It accounts for about two-thirds of all the vegetable oils 
and animal fats consumed in the United States and is used mainly in salad and cooking 
oil, bakery shortening, and margarine. The United States, Argentina, and Brazil also are 
the three leading producers of soybean oil (Table 2). Most of it is consumed at home, but 
some—around 20 percent of worldwide production—is imported by the ROW. Notably,  
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TABLE 2. Soybean oil production and utilization, 1998–99 (million mt) 
  Net  in  
 Production Exports Stocks Consumption 
World 24.56 NA -0.02 24.58 
United States 8.20 1.04 0.06 7.10 
South America 7.55 3.78 -0.02 3.79 
   Argentina 3.16 3.08 -0.02 0.10 
   Brazil 4.04 1.22 0.00 2.82 
   Paraguay 0.12 0.09 -0.00 0.04 
Rest of the World 8.81 -4.82 -0.06 13.69 
   European Union 2.92 1.06 0.03 1.83 
   China 2.05 -0.87 -0.16 3.08 
   Mid-East/N Africa 0.26 -1.64 0.03 1.87 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 2002a.   
 
the European Union is self-sufficient in soybean oil production (thanks to sizeable crush-
ing of imported soybeans), but many other countries, including China and the countries 
of the Middle East and North Africa, import oil.  
Soybean meal is the most valuable product obtained from soybean processing. It is 
the world’s dominant high-protein feed, accounting for nearly 65 percent of world sup-
plies (USDA 2002b). About 98 percent of soybean meal is used for livestock feed, and 
the remainder is used in human foods such as bakery ingredients and meat substitutes. 
The European Union is the largest importer of soybean meal, and trade in that market 
flows from the United States, Brazil, and Argentina to the ROW (Table 3). 
In summary, the world’s soybean market consists of three closely related products: 
soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal. These three products form what is called the 
soybean complex, which will be the subject of further analysis in this paper. The main 
players in the soybean complex in terms of their production and trading status are the 
United States, South America, and the ROW. 
The soybean crop has been one of the first to take advantage of agricultural biotech-
nology. Since their commercial introduction in 1996, herbicide-tolerant Roundup Ready 
(RR) soybeans gained rapid acceptance among U.S. and Argentine farmers (Table 4). In 
the 1998–99 marketing year, the adoption rate was 36 percent in the United States and 
more than double that in Argentina, and both rates continued to grow in subsequent years. 
The adoption of agricultural biotechnology thus constitutes another important dimension 
based on which one soybean region can be differentiated from another. In South 
6 / Sobolevsky, Moschini, and Lapan 
 
TABLE 3. Soybean meal production and utilization, 1998–99 (million mt) 
  Net  in  
 Production Exports Stocks Consumption 
World 108.36 NA 0.99 107.37 
United States 34.29 6.37 0.11 27.81 
South America 32.19 22.01 0.15 10.03 
   Argentina 13.69 13.22 0.02 0.45 
   Brazil 17.01 9.98 0.13 6.90 
   Paraguay 0.51 0.41 0.00 0.10 
Rest of the World 41.88 -28.38 0.73 69.53 
   European Union 12.92 -14.91 0.17 27.66 
   China 10.03 -1.39 0.00 11.42 
   Mid-East/N Africa 1.23 -3.70 0.01 4.92 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 2002a. 
 
TABLE 4. Acreage and adoption of Roundup Ready soybeans (million ha) 
     Adoption 
Rate 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 1998–99a 
World 5.1 14.5 21.6 25.8  
Unites States 3.6 10.2 15.0 16.5 0.36 
South America 1.4 4.3 6.4 9.1  
   Brazil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
   Paraguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 
   Argentina 1.4 4.3 6.4 9.1 0.72 
   Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Rest of the World 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.00 
Source: James 2000. 
a
 Marketing year: September–August. 
 
America, Brazil, and Argentina took different paths with respect to adopting RR soy-
beans because of different government policies. It is therefore important to account for 
these differences in current and possible future regional policies by separating South 
America into two regions. Thus, in addition to the United States and the ROW, the pre-
sent model distinguishes the regions of Brazil and Argentina.2  
 
The Model 
In the model, product differentiation applies only to soybeans and soybean oil be-
cause, to date, biotech-based product differentiation in soybean meal (which is essentially 
used as feed) looks very unlikely. Differentiated demands for soybeans and soybean oil 
Genetically Modified Crop Innovations and Product Differentiation / 7 
exist because of the underlying heterogeneity of consumers in the respective regions, 
resulting in the RR variety being weakly inferior to the conventional one. The specifica-
tion of supply is based on Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000 and is extended to 
account for identity preservation costs. It is assumed that identity preservation is achieved 
by a constant-cost segregation technology. RR soybean seed is sold by an innovator-
monopolist at a premium. In addition, the model takes into account government price 
support policy available to U.S. farmers in the form of marketing assistance loans and 
loan deficiency payments (LDPs). The model is calibrated so as to predict prices and 
quantities in the soybean complex for the crop year 1998–99, the most recent complete 
year when the analysis was undertaken, and is solved for several scenarios of interest.  
Demand 
Introducing a product innovation in our setting requires specifying two separate de-
mands—for conventional and RR varieties—in the post-innovation period both for 
soybeans and soybean oil. Also, the model must allow for the pre-innovation demand for 
only the conventional variety and for the post-innovation demand for only the (de facto) 
RR variety in the world with no segregation technology. All these demands should arise 
from the same preference ordering if welfare calculations are to be meaningful. There are 
many possible approaches for modeling demand in this product-differentiation setting, 
including the use of product characteristics models (e.g., Hotelling 1929; Lancaster 1979; 
see also Helpman and Krugman 1989) and of love-of-variety models (e.g., Dixit and 
Stiglitz 1977; see also Helpman and Krugman 1989). However, as emphasized in Lapan 
and Moschini 2001, in our setting it is important that the demand specification embody 
the fact that the GM product is a “weakly inferior” substitute for the traditional one (not 
just an imperfect substitute). The presumption here is that consumers agree that the GM 
soybean product does not have any additional attribute from the consumers’ point of 
view. Ceteris paribus, all consumers will weakly prefer the non-GM product. But 
whereas some consumers may be willing to pay strictly positive amounts to avoid the 
GM product, some consumers may be willing to pay very little or may be indifferent be-
tween the two products. Thus, the GM product will never command a price that exceeds 
that of the non-GM product.  
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To implement the notion of “weakly inferior” substitutes, Moschini and Lapan 
(2000) postulate a population of heterogeneous consumers where some consumers con-
sider the two varieties to be perfect substitutes while others consider the new GM variety 
to be inferior to the existing variety. Under perfect information, these latter consumers 
will be willing to buy the GM variety only at a discount. Specifically, preferences for 
consumers of type θ  are represented by the quasilinear utility function: 
 ( )0 1U u q q yθ= + +  (1) 
where (.)u  is increasing and strictly concave, 0q  and 1q  denote physical consumption by 
the consumer of the non-GM and GM product, respectively, and y  denotes the consump-
tion of a numéraire good. The parameter [ ]0,1θ ∈  reflects the fact that consumers value 
the GM variety of the good less (strictly so if 1θ < ) than the non-GM one. Given this 
structure, the demand by a consumer of type θ  depends upon the relative prices of each 
variety. In particular, a consumer of type θ  will buy the GM variety if and only if 
1 0p pθ≤ .3 Thus, from (1), the individual demand curves can be written as 
 ( )00q d p=  and 1 0q =   for ˆθ θ<    (2)  
 0 0q =   and  ( )11 1q d p θθ= for ˆθ θ≥  (3) 
where ( )1 0ˆ ,1Min p pθ ≡     and the demand function satisfies 1(.) (.)d u− ′= . Aggregate 
market demand functions can then be defined as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ
0 0 1 0
0
,Q p p d p dF
θ
θ= ∫  (4) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )11 0 1 1
ˆ
1
,Q p p d p dF
θ
θ θ
θ
= ∫  (5) 
where ( )F θ  denotes the distribution function of consumer types.  
Because aggregation in such a case is exact, we can alternatively think of 0 0 1( , )Q p p  
and 1 0 1( , )Q p p  as arising from the choices of a representative consumer who consumes 
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both varieties (provided that 0 1p p≥ ). Assuming that these goods are measured in the 
same physical units, two possible types of indifference sets for the representative con-
sumer are represented in Figures A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. The first case represents 
preferences that are strictly convex, so that to obtain a positive demand for the new prod-
uct one must have 1 0p p< . The second case is more general, allowing (in the 
heterogeneous consumers’ interpretation) a positive mass of consumers being perfectly 
indifferent between good 0 and good 1 as long as 1 0p p= .  
Based on the foregoing discussion, we specify a linear demand system for conven-
tional and RR differentiated products that allows for gross substitution, weak preference 
for the conventional good, and some degree of indifference between the two goods. The 
following parameterizations apply to any product in any region, but for notational sim-
plicity, the subscripts denoting a product and a region are omitted in this section. 
Adopting a linear specification for 0 0 1( , )Q p p  and 1 0 1( , )Q p p , the demand functions 
for conventional and RR soybean products are written as 
 
0 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 0
1 1
Q a b p cp
if p p
Q a b p cp
= − + 
>
= − + 
 (6) 
 
{ }
{ }
0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
1
1 1
( ) , ( ) ( 2 )
0, ( )
Q a b c p a a b b c p
if p p p
Q a b c p
∈ − − + − + − 
= ≡
∈ − − 
 (7) 
 
0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
1
( ) ( 2 )
0
Q a a b b c p
if p p
Q
= + − + − 
<
= 
 (8) 
where all parameters are strictly positive. Note that the symmetry condition is main-
tained, such that this demand system is integrable into well-defined (quasilinear) 
preferences, a condition that will become important when making welfare evaluations. 
The total demand that is implied by this structure is 
 
0 1
0 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( )TQ a a b c p b c p= + − − − − . (9) 
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Note that the curvature conditions associated with (6), 0b c> and 1b c> , imply that 
the total demand is non-increasing in either price. Also note that, at 0 1p p= , (6) gives 
1 0
1 1( )Q a b c p= − −  (subject to 0 1 1/( )p a b c≤ − ). This is the maximum quantity that “indif-
ferent” consumers buy of RR product at these prices, and if they buy less, the difference 
must be covered by purchases of the conventional variety. With 0 1p p< , demand for 1Q  
vanishes.  
The underlying preferences are described by the quasilinear indirect utility function: 
 
0 1 0 1 0 2 1 2 0 1
0 1 0 1
1 1( , , ) ( ) ( )
2 2
V p p I I a p a p b p b p cp p = − + − − +    (10) 
where I is income and the price of the numéraire good is normalized to one. It is useful to 
note that our approach allows us to handle welfare measurement in a coherent way. A 
conceptual difficulty with analyzing the welfare implications of new products arises be-
cause of the need to compare pre- and post-innovation states of the world that have 
different dimensions in product space. Fisher and Shell (1968) showed that new products 
could be consistently modeled by being entered in the pre-innovation product space with 
their market prices set to reservation (also called “choke”) values, that is, the hypothetical 
prices at which their derived demands equal zero.  
Following this approach, the specification in equation (8) will be used to describe the 
differentiated market before the introduction of RR products, with the RR reservation 
price implicitly set above 0p  (i.e., we imagine that the new technology is possible but 
prohibitively expensive). When the new technology is adopted, no matter how incom-
pletely, and the RR and conventional varieties are not separated in the supply chain, the 
effective demand for conventional product is assumed to be zero (we postulate that this 
case reflects the fact that the price that must be paid to ensure that the consumed product 
is GM-free is prohibitively high). To describe this scenario, for any given 1p , the 
“choke” price 0 10 0( ) /p a cp b≡ +  drives the demand for the conventional product to zero. 
Therefore, 
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0
0 02
1 10
1 1
0 0
0Q
if p pca cQ a b p
b b
= 
≥  
= + − −    
. (11) 
Note that the conditions 0b c>  and 1b c>  ensure that this demand is also downward slop-
ing.  
A complete specification of the demand system (6)–(8) for all prices in the nonnega-
tive quadrant 2+  is represented in Figures A.3 and A.4. Two distinct specifications arise 
depending on the relative values of demand parameters. By comparison, the general two-
good linear demand system specification is represented in Figure A.5.  
For later use, the price elasticities of differentiated demands for the case 0 1p p≥  are 
defined as 
 
1
11
1 1
pb Qε = −
,   
0
10
1
p
c Qε =
,   
0
00
0 0
pb Qε = −
,  and 
1
01
0
p
c Qε =
. (12) 
It also may be useful to define an aggregate elasticity, call it a scale elasticity, that tells us 
how total demand (for conventional and RR varieties) reacts to scaling of all prices: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
0 1
0 1
0 1
1
,
,
T T T
T
T T
t
Q tp tp b c p b c pt
t Q Q p p
ε
=
∂
− − − −
= =
∂
  (13) 
Finally, the undifferentiated demand is assumed to have a linear functional form: 
 ( )UQ p a bp= −  (14) 
where p is either the own price of undifferentiated soybean meal or the price of the 
cheaper or the only available variety (which could be a conventional variety) in a region 
inhabited by consumers who do not have differentiated tastes. The own-price elasticity of 
the demand (14) is defined as 
 
UU Ub p Qε = − . (15) 
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Supply 
A parsimonious specification of the soybean supply function that accounts for the 
main features of soybean production practices, reflects the nature of biotechnology inno-
vation in the soybean industry, and is suitable for calibration purposes was developed in 
Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000. This specification is briefly restated, and its ex-
tensions necessary for the purposes of this paper are discussed next. 
Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky’s (2000) model assumes homogeneous soybean 
farmers who have the choice of growing conventional or RR soybeans or both, who are 
not required to segregate the two varieties during the production process, and who there-
fore receive the same price for either variety. The aggregate soybean supply function is 
written as BY L y= ⋅ , where BY  is total production consisting of a mix of conventional and 
RR soybeans, L is land allocated to soybeans, and y denotes yield (production per hec-
tare).4  Production per hectare depends on the use of seeds x and of all other inputs z. It is 
assumed that the per-hectare production function ( , )f z x  requires a constant optimal den-
sity of seeds δ  (amount of seed per unit of land), irrespective of the use of other inputs, 
for all likely levels of input and output prices. Hence, the variable profit function (per 
hectare), defined as 
 { }( , , ) max ( , )
,
B Bp r w p f z x r z wx
z x
π = − ⋅ − , (16) 
is written in the additive form ( , , ) ( , )B Bp r w p r wπ π δ= − , where Bp  is the price of soy-
beans, r is the price vector of all inputs (excluding land and seed), and w is the price of 
soybean seed. These assumptions imply that the (optimal) yield function does not depend 
on the price of seed: 
 
( , , ) ( , ) ( , )B B B
B B
p r w p r y p r
p p
π π∂ ∂
= ≡
∂ ∂

. (17) 
Land devoted to soybeans is the result of an optimal land allocation problem that depends 
on net returns (profit per hectare) of soybeans and of other competing crops, as well as 
the total availability of land. If all other unit profits (and total land) are treated as con-
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stant, they can be subsumed in the functional representation ( )L L π=  such that total sup-
ply of soybeans is written as 
 ( ( , ) ) ( , )B B BY L p r w y p rπ δ= − ⋅ . (18) 
The new RR technology is embedded in the seed. By assumption, the amount of seed 
used per hectare is constant, but the new technology is assumed superior such that, at all 
relevant input price levels (and excluding seed price), the profit per hectare is increased. 
That is, if the superscripted 1 denotes the new technology and 0 the old one, then 
 
1 0( , ) ( , )B Bp r p rπ π>  . (19) 
Specifically, the per-hectare profit functions for the conventional technology ( 0π ) and for 
the RR technology ( 1π ) are parameterized as follows: 
 
0 1
1 B
GA p wηπ δ
η
+
= + −
+
 (20) 
 
1 1(1 ) (1 )
1 B
GA p wηβπ α δ µ
η
++
= + + − +
+
 (21) 
where η  is the elasticity of yield with respect to soybean price; A and G are parameters 
subsuming all other input prices, presumed constant; β  is the coefficient of yield change 
due to the RR technology; α  is the coefficient of unit profit increase due to the RR tech-
nology; and µ   is the markup (which reflects the technology fee) on RR seed price 
charged by the innovator-monopolist who developed the RR technology. Therefore, the 
unit profit advantage of the new technology can be written as 
 
1
1 B
G p wηβπ α δµ
η
+∆ = + −
+
. (22)  
It is useful to note that this formulation allows the new technology to affect yield 
(through the parameter β ), and profit per hectare is affected through this parameter and, 
separately, through the parameter α . The yield functions are 0 By Gpη=  for the conven-
tional technology and 1 (1 ) By Gpηβ= +  for the RR one. 
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Although the behavior of the innovator-monopolist will take into account the equilib-
rium conditions in the system (Lapan and Moschini 2002), in this study we will not 
attempt to endogenize the innovator’s optimizing behavior. Instead, we will rely on the 
observed pricing practice and the RR seed markup, and study the new technology’s diffu-
sion process conditional on that. Thus, for a given adoption rate of RR 
technology [ ]0,1ρ ∈ , measured as a share of RR soybean acres in total land devoted to 
soybeans and the non-segregated soybean price Bp , the average profit per hectare is 
 
1(1 ) (1 )
1 B
GA p wηρβπ ρα δ ρµ
η
++
= + + − +
+
 (23) 
such that the corresponding average yield is (1 ) By Gpηρβ= + . Supply of land to the soy-
bean industry is written in constant-elasticity form as a function of average land rents that 
depend on output price and adoption rates; that is, 
 L θλπ=  (24) 
whereθ  is the elasticity of land supply with respect to soybean profit per hectare, and λ  
is scale parameter. For calibration purposes, it is useful to note that the parameter θ  can 
be readily related to the more standard elasticity of land supply with respect to soybean 
prices. Specifically, rθ ψ= , where ψ  is elasticity of land supply with respect to soybean 
prices and ( )Br p yπ≡  is the farmer’s share (rent) of unit revenue. Finally, the aggregate 
supply of soybeans in a non-segregated market is written as 
 
1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1B B B
GY A p w Gp
θ
η ηρβλ ρα δ ρµ ρβ
η
+ +
= + + − + + +  . (25) 
As was mentioned before, this model is based on the assumption that farmers are homo-
geneous. To some extent, this assumption is a simplification. The RR technology seems 
to benefit farmers by reducing costs and, to a lesser extent, by increasing yields, albeit 
these gains are partially offset by the higher seed prices. The profitability of the new 
technology is likely to be subject to variation at the farm level. To be sure, a supply 
model that explicitly accounts for heterogeneity of farm characteristics, and which can 
naturally explain incomplete adoption of the new technology, could be specified as in 
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Lapan and Moschini 2002. The approach taken here abstracts from farm-level heteroge-
neities and thus simplifies the calibration and simulation process. But the model still 
allows for incomplete adoption, which here arises because the two types of goods are 
imperfect substitutes.  
Differentiated Products and Segregation Costs 
The requirement that two distinct varieties of soybeans be maintained in order to 
serve differentiated soybean product markets (GM and non-GM) gives rise to additional 
production and marketing costs associated mainly with the nonbiotech variety, costs that 
would not exist otherwise. Consumers who do not have differentiated tastes (or, equiva-
lently, who regard the GM and non-GM products as perfect substitutes) will be 
indifferent between consuming GM and non-GM varieties. Consequently, the production 
and marketing chain of nonbiotech soybeans ultimately will bear the additional cost of 
segregating the non-GM product because GMO-conscious consumers will demand certi-
fication that the product they consume is free from GM material (Golan and Kuchler 
2000). From this standpoint, the voluntary efforts of nonbiotech producers and marketers 
are all that is needed to have both product varieties available in the marketplace. How-
ever, as analyzed in Lapan and Moschini 2002, mandatory labeling that imposes an 
additional wasteful cost on the biotech market segment is also possible, as evidenced by 
policies being implemented in the European Union. In what follows, however, we do not 
model explicitly the impact of such additional regulatory costs. In any case, prohibitively 
high regulatory costs imposed by importing regions would make biotech exports simply 
cease, which is equivalent to the import ban scenario that we analyze.  
Separation of non-GM soybeans and soybean products requires extensive segrega-
tion activities known as “identity preservation” (Lin, Chambers, and Harwood 2000; 
Bullock and Desquilbet 2002). That includes separation of non-GM beans at all levels of 
production and in the supply chain, from planting through harvest, storage, and transpor-
tation, at the expense of additional cleaning of equipment, cleaning or maintaining 
separate storage facilities, and testing for GM content at various points in the marketing 
system. Some of these additional costs may stay constant but others are likely to diminish 
per unit of output as the scale of nonbiotech production increases. As nonbiotech demand 
becomes more sizeable, there would be more elevators in the vicinity of any given soy-
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bean farm operation willing to accept non-GM soybeans, which may be expected to re-
duce farmers’ transportation costs. For as many as 95 percent of U.S. elevators, 
separating non-GM soybeans is likely to require new investments (Lin, Chambers, and 
Harwood 2000), and in other regions of the world, the situation should be similar, imply-
ing processing economies of scale. Even with existing facilities, elevators should enjoy 
economies of scale as costs of maintaining separate loading, unloading, and storage fa-
cilities or routine cleaning of common facilities before accepting non-GM crop—as well 
as costs of “storing air”—will fall per ton of non-GM soybeans if the quantity were to 
increase. Economies of scale in shipping, especially containerized shipping, may be less 
evident unless shipments of non-GM soybeans are so small that such commonly used 
means of transportation as unit trains of about 100 cars or river barges cannot be fully 
utilized.  
In this model we simplify the specification of unit segregation costs, denoted by ϕ , 
by assuming that they are a positive constant if the region in question produces both va-
rieties, and that they are zero if the region only grows the traditional variety. Thus, 
 
constant if 0
0 if 0
ρϕ ρ
>
= 
= . (26) 
In our model, segregation costs arise between the production level (at the farm gate) and 
the point of domestic user demand (or, equivalently, the exporting point for goods to be 
shipped to foreign markets). Thus, ϕ  represents a wedge between the producer and the 
home consumer price or, if the product is not consumed at home, the importing region’s 
consumer price minus transportation costs. 
Assuming that segregation or identity preservation costs are borne entirely by the us-
ers of conventional technology, the profit functions per hectare in each region consistent 
with the parametric specifications in (20) and (21) are defined as follows: 
 ( )10 01 BGA p w
η
π ϕ δ
η
+
= + − −
+
 (27) 
 
1 1 1(1 ) ( ) (1 )
1 B
GA p wηβπ α δ µ
η
++
= + + − +
+
 (28) 
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where 0Bp  is the market price (at the demand level) of conventional soybeans and 1Bp  is 
the market price of RR soybeans, so that the farmer (producer) price in the conventional 
soybean market is 0Bp ϕ− . 
The relationship between 0π  and 1π  determines which technology is adopted by 
farmers. Because no heterogeneity among farmers is allowed in the model, the equilibrium 
in which both soybean varieties are produced requires that farmers are indifferent between 
the two technologies, i.e., 0 1π π= . Thus, equilibrium in the soybean market where both 
varieties are produced rules out a non-binding incentive compatibility constraint. 
As discussed, in our model we take the choice of the monopolist as given; that is, the 
parameter µ  that measures the markup on RR seed prices is taken from the data. Defini-
tions (27) and (28) imply that yield functions are 0 0( )By G p ηϕ= −  for the conventional 
technology and 1 1(1 ) ( )By G p ηβ= +  for the RR technology. Total supply of land to the 
soybean industry in each region is written in constant-elasticity form (24) as a function of 
average land rents, where 
 
0
0 1 0 1
1
0
(1 ) (0,1).
1
π ρ
π ρ π ρπ π π ρ
π ρ
 =
= − + = = ∈
=
 (29) 
The region’s adoption rate ρ  or, equivalently, the land allocation between conven-
tional and RR soybeans is endogenously determined in equilibrium. But for a given ρ , 
RR and conventional soybeans will have Lρ  and (1 )Lρ−  hectares of land allocated to 
them, respectively, and thus aggregate supply of each soybean variety in each region can 
be written in equilibrium as 
 
0 0 1 0( ) (1 ) ( )
1B B B
GY A p w G p
θ
η ηλ ϕ δ ρ ϕ
η
+ 
= + − − − − +   (30) 
 
1 1 1 1(1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )
1B B B
GY A p w G p
θ
η ηβλ α δ µ ρ β
η
+ +
= + + − + + +  . (31) 
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U.S. Price Support Policies 
The supply equations (30) and (31) were obtained under the assumption of no gov-
ernment intervention in the soybean sector. In reality, many countries in the world pursue 
high price support policies to encourage agricultural production. For the soybean sector, in 
particular, a major support program in recent years has been provided to U.S. producers 
based on the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, which established 
that nonrecourse marketing assistance loans and LDPs be administered for the 1996 
through 2002 crop years (USDA 1998). Farmers may choose one of the two support op-
tions: a loan or an LDP. A loan pays a fixed dollar amount per bushel of soybeans, uses the 
harvested crop as collateral, and has a maturity period of nine months. A national average 
loan rate is fixed at the beginning of the crop year. For soybeans, it is established at the 
level of 85 percent of the simple average price received by producers during the marketing 
years for the immediately preceding five crops, excluding the highest and lowest prices, but 
no less than $4.92 per bushel ($180.76 per mt) and no more than $5.26 per bushel ($193.25 
per mt). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) tracks current market prices using 
so-called posted county prices (PCPs). The loan plus accrued interest may be repaid in full 
any time before maturity when the PCP is higher than that combined amount. If the PCP is 
lower than the loan rate plus interest, the loan is repaid by paying just the PCP, with pro-
ducers realizing a “marketing loan gain.” Finally, the farmer may simply wait until 
maturity and forfeit the collateral crop to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), the 
issuer of the loan.  
When a farmer decides to receive an LDP, he gets the difference between his county’s 
loan rate and the PCP if the latter is lower. This price support program gives farmers a num-
ber of options, but essentially, it establishes an effective floor for the soybean price at the 
farm level. It turns out that, whereas the 1996 and 1997 soybean crops did not benefit from 
LDPs, soybean prices got as low as $150/mt in the following years, well below the national 
average loan rate of $193/mt that remained fixed at that level until 2002. Only in the summer 
of 2002 did soybean prices start to recover and they exceeded the loan rate in July for the first 
time in four years. But during that four-year period, LDPs played a significant role in the 
U.S. soybean industry and they will continue to do so if prices decline again.  
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In the context of our model, we wish to account for the effects of this particular price 
support program. In particular, we want to assess the impact that this market distortion 
has on the size and distribution of the estimated benefits from RR soybean innovation. A 
number of studies, summarized in Alston and Martin 1995, explain how price-distorting 
policies may affect the size and distribution of returns to research. Murphy, Furtan, and 
Schmitz (1993) even demonstrate the possibility of immiserizing technical change, a pos-
sibility actually envisioned earlier in Johnson 1967 and Bhagwati 1968 (who demonstrate 
that growth may be welfare-reducing because of various trade policy distortions and 
terms-of-trade effects caused by market power in trade). When domestic producers in the 
large exporting country enjoy a fixed price support, the research-induced supply shift has 
a range of implications. The welfare-reducing implications are the leftward shift in the 
ROW’s excess demand due to the spillover of new technology overseas and the increase 
in the export subsidy bill at home caused by higher exports and a lower world price. The 
welfare-enhancing implications are the increase in producer and consumer surplus at 
home and overseas.5 Murphy, Furtan, and Schmitz (1993) show that taking most of these 
effects into account—they assume domestic consumers are locked into high support 
prices and omit any rents arising from patenting the new technology—makes it theoreti-
cally possible for a technical change to have a negative ex post (i.e., without accounting 
for R&D expenditures) welfare impact not only for the exporting country undergoing 
technological growth but for the world at large. Alston and Martin (1995) confirm with 
their more general model that technical change can lead to a loss or gain in welfare de-
pending on whether it worsens an existing distortion to the extent that the increase in 
social costs of the distortion is greater than the maximum potential benefit of the techni-
cal change. 
The implications of the price support programs for unit profit and supply functions of 
U.S. farmers are straightforward. Denoting by LDPp  the average price offered by price 
support programs and assuming that these programs treat conventional and RR soybean 
growers uniformly (i.e., pay the same price for conventional and RR soybeans), supply 
equations (30) and (31) for the United States may be rewritten as 
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1 11 1(1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )
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= + + − + + +  , (33) 
where 0 0max{ , }LDP BBp p p ϕ= −  and 
1 1max{ , }LDP BBp p p= . 
 
Trade and Market Equilibrium 
In our model, the world is divided into four regions: the United States (subscripted 
U), Brazil (subscripted Z; includes Brazil and Paraguay), Argentina (subscripted A; in-
cludes all other countries of South America), and the ROW (subscripted R). Such 
regional division of the world allows the model to specifically describe individual eco-
nomic characteristics of the main players in the soybean complex and emphasize the 
existing differences among them. The model allows us to study whether different regions 
are affected differently by the introduction of RR technology, and to model region-
specific policy actions of interest and estimate their economic impact on each region 
separately. 
In the model, trade takes place at all levels of the soybeans complex: in soybeans 
(subscripted B), soybean oil (subscripted O), and soybean meal (subscripted M). Any 
region can be involved in trading any product of any variety, and there are no a priori 
restrictions on the direction of trade. The spatial relationship among prices in different 
regions is established using constant price differentials defined for each pair of regions 
for each product, each variety, and each possible direction of trade flow. These spatial 
price differentials essentially represent transportation costs but may also incorporate the 
effects of the existing import policies. 
Equilibrium Conditions 
We assume that crushing one unit of soybeans produces Oγ  units of oil and Mγ  units 
of meal, and that unit crushing costs (crushing margins) are constant and equal to im  
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(where the subscript i indexes the region). Then, the spatial market equilibrium condi-
tions for the three-good, four-region model previously outlined are as follows: 
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
, , , , , , , ,
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0 0 0
, , ,B i B j B ijp p t− ≤ , i,j = U, A, Z, R, i ≠ j (42) 
 
1 1 1
, , ,B i B j B ijp p t− ≤ , i,j = U, A, Z, R, i ≠ j (43) 
 
0 0 0
, , ,O i O j O ijp p t− ≤ , i,j = U, A, Z, R, i ≠ j (44) 
 
1 1 1
, , ,O i O j O ijp p t− ≤ , i,j = U, A, Z, R, i ≠ j (45) 
 
, , ,M i M j M ijp p t− ≤ , i,j = U, A, Z, R, i ≠ j (46) 
Equations (34) and (36) are market clearing equations requiring that the total world 
soybean demand for direct use and processing equals world supply in each variety. Equa-
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tions (35) and (37) specify market clearing conditions in conventional and RR markets of 
regions that do not trade in conventional or RR soybeans and oil in equilibrium, if such 
regions exist. These non-trading regions’ indices are stored in I0 and I1, the subsets of the 
index set {U, A, Z, R}. Of course, it is possible that I0 is an empty set. Also, given (34), 
the number of elements in I0 should not exceed three. The same applies to I1. Equation 
(38) ensures that the soybean equivalents of oil and meal demands are the same on ag-
gregate.  
Equations (39) and (40) ensure that soybean processors of either variety receive a 
constant crushing margin im , i=U, A, Z, R, to cover their costs ( im  is the exogenous pa-
rameter determined at the calibration stage). Because of the existence of spatial price 
linkages among trading regions, each of these equations should be applied only to a sin-
gle trading partner and any non-trading regions if such exist.  For equation (39) this 
means that it must be imposed in every region whose index is stored in I0 and I2, where I2 
is the set containing a single index of any of the regions trading in the conventional vari-
ety. Similarly, equation (40) applies in regions with indices from I1 and I3, where I3 is the 
set containing a single index of any of the regions trading in the RR variety. 
Equation (41) describes the incentive compatibility constraints that must be satisfied 
in each region in equilibrium. Production of both conventional and RR soybeans takes 
place only when the respective unit profits are the same, i.e., when farmers are indifferent 
about which variety to produce. Otherwise, they produce only the more profitable variety. 
Equations (42) through (46) define the spatial configuration of prices. Because differ-
entiated markets for GM and non-GM soybean products are not well developed at present, 
various assumptions can be made with respect to possible configuration of trade flows, 
which warrants the most general specification. However, the four-region spatial model is 
restricted to have a maximum of three trade flows in each product variety. In the case of the 
soybean complex and the chosen regional division of the world, there are three trade flows 
that are most likely to prevail in any conceivable equilibrium. Currently, the trade takes 
place between the United States and the ROW, between Brazil and the ROW, and between 
Argentina and the ROW, but whether this is the case in differentiated markets will be de-
termined by equilibrium. Let 
,
k
m ijt  denote price differentials (transportation costs) that are 
assumed symmetric for each pair of regions.6 Whenever trade between two regions in a 
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particular product variety exists, the corresponding inequality becomes an equality; other-
wise, the inequality must be strict. An assumption about the direction of trade is necessary 
to replace absolute values with an appropriate sign. 
The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed by the normal shape of 
demand and supply curves as defined earlier (Samuelson 1952). But because we are as-
suming that a region producing only conventional soybeans pays no segregation cost, we 
are introducing a discontinuity that can affect the uniqueness property of equilibrium.  
As mentioned earlier, the model assumes that the soybean and soybean oil demands 
in the ROW are the only differentiated demands in the system, while U.S., Argentine, and 
Brazilian consumers remain indifferent to what variety of soybeans, oil, or meal they 
consume. In a nontrivial differentiated equilibrium with no production or import bans 
(i.e., the one in which both varieties are produced and consumed), we can then define the 
demands that appeared in (34)–(46) more explicitly: 
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Were we to assume that all four regions have differentiated demands in soybeans and 
soybean oil, only the last of the five identities in (47) would apply. 
A limitation of the equilibrium system (34)–(46) is that it does not allow recovery of 
individual trade flows for all goods, i.e., to provide separate values for exports/imports of 
soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal. The reason for this ambiguity is that, once a 
region has an excess supply of soybeans available for meeting an excess demand for oil 
and/or meal, these soybeans can be either crushed in the exporting region and exported in 
the form of oil and meal or they can be equivalently exported in the form of soybeans and 
crushed by the region-importer. This feature is ultimately due to the assumption of the 
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constant-returns-to-scale crushing technology in all regions of the world, which makes 
the interregional distribution of crush undetermined in equilibrium. 
Consequently, the only meaningful trade flow result that can be reported in equilib-
rium is the factor content of trade in the form of the excess supply of soybeans (in each 
variety) remaining after subtracting domestic soybean demand and the soybean equiva-
lent of domestic oil demand from the domestic supply of beans: 
 
, , , ,
1
, , , ; 0,1j j j jB i B i B i O i
O
ES Y Q Q i U A Z R j
γ
= − − = = . (48) 
We can call 
,
j
B iES  the soybean-equivalent net exports. However, this definition is not 
very precise because this “equivalence” measure does not capture all volume of trade 
between regions. The missing element is the residual excess supply of soybean meal aris-
ing because the soybeans that are crushed to meet domestic oil demand need not yield the 
amount of meal exactly equal to domestic meal demand: 
 ( )0 1, , , ,1 , , ,M i O i O i M M i
O
ES Q Q Q i U A Z Rγ
γ
= + − = . (49) 
The “meal exports” heading in the results tables in the appendix reports 
,M iES . 
Solution Algorithm 
Given this setting, we are faced with the task of solving a spatial four-region, three-
good equilibrium model. The literature on spatial equilibrium models can be traced back 
to Samuelson (1952), who shows that in the partial-equilibrium (one commodity) context 
the problem of finding a competitive equilibrium among spatially separated markets 
could be converted mathematically into a maximum problem. Defining the net social 
payoff function as the sum of the areas under all regions’ excess demand curves minus 
total transportation cost, Samuelson proves that maximization of this net welfare func-
tion, providing that all domestic supply curves cut demand curves from below as price 
rises, would result in a unique solution with prices and quantities that satisfied all proper-
ties of the spatial price equilibrium. He also suggests that this maximization problem 
could be solved by trial and error or by a systematic procedure of varying export ship-
ments consistently in the direction of increasing social welfare. 
Genetically Modified Crop Innovations and Product Differentiation / 25 
Samuelson’s result not only makes it easy to produce rigorous qualitative compara-
tive statics predictions but also shows how to actually solve some spatial equilibrium 
models in an era of limited computing resources. Takayama and Judge (1964, 1970) ex-
tend Samuelson’s work to a multiple-commodity competitive equilibrium case and 
demonstrate that the problem, under the additional assumption of linear aggregate re-
gional demand and supply functions, can be converted to a quadratic programming 
problem and solved using available simplex methods. Takayama and Judge (1970, 1971) 
also show that their approach would work not only for linear demand specifications that 
satisfy symmetry conditions but also for spatial models with asymmetric demand coeffi-
cients, and that the model can still be solved using a quadratic programming technique 
when competition is replaced by monopolistic behavior. 
Although the quadratic programming approach in the framework of linear market 
specification proved to be very efficient and hence very popular in economic research on 
agriculture, energy, and minerals, the attempts to introduce nonlinear demand and supply 
specifications in the spatial equilibrium models were not as successful. Takayama and 
Labys (1986) pointed out that optimization-based solution algorithms with nonlinear de-
mands and supplies were becoming extremely complicated and time consuming, 
imposing a computational burden that, in their view, was just too high to justify choosing 
nonlinear specifications.  
In the present model, the size of the spatial equilibrium system is not very large, and 
computer time at modern processing speeds is not a limiting factor. Nevertheless, because 
of nonlinearities in the model’s supply specification, the existing quadratic programming 
algorithms cannot be applied, and no other ready algorithm is available. Therefore, the 
choice was made to solve directly the system of nonlinear equations defining the spatial 
equilibrium conditions by using available numerical techniques. 
The model (34)−(46) is solved using GAUSS, the software equipped with the eqSolve 
procedure that solves N × N systems of nonlinear equations by inverting the system’s Jaco-
bian while iterating until convergence. Obviously, all equations must be binding. In our 
case, however, the number of binding equations in (34)−(46) is not determined a priori. 
There are two sources of ambiguity: the number of trade flows in each commodity and the 
possible specialization in production of a particular soybean variety in each region. For 
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example, when differentiated markets exist only in the ROW, the size of the binding por-
tion of the system (34)−(46) can be anywhere from N=5 to N=21. 
GAUSS provides no capability for changing the dimensions of the system of equa-
tions as it is being solved. Thus, the solution algorithm looks for the equilibrium by 
repeatedly solving the fluctuating-in-size binding portion of the system (34)−(46) over all 
of the following combinations: (a) each region specializes in conventional soybeans, in 
RR soybeans, or does not specialize; (b) there is no trade in RR beans/oil; (c) there is 
only one RR trade flow involving a pair of regions, in either direction, for all possible 
region pairs; (d) there are two RR trade flows, in all possible combinations of directions, 
excluding (for arbitrage reasons) cases when the same region is both exporter and im-
porter of the same product(s); (e) there are three RR trade flows, in all possible 
combinations of directions, excluding (for arbitrage reasons) cases when the same region 
is both exporter and importer of the same product(s). When each of the above scenarios is 
solved, the solution—if it exists—is checked against the remaining non-binding equa-
tions of the system (34)−(46). When a differentiated market equilibrium satisfying the 
system (34)−(46) is found, the model solves the benchmark pre-innovation, undifferenti-
ated equilibrium and computes consumer and producer surpluses, innovator-monopolist’s 
profit, and the subsidy to U.S. farmers. 
 
Calibration 
The parameters of the model are calibrated such as to predict prices and quantities in 
the soybean complex for the crop year 1998–99, the most recent complete year when the 
analysis was undertaken. Production and utilization data are given in Tables 1 through 3.  
The history of world adoption rates for RR soybeans is provided in Table 4, with the 
adoption rates used in calibration shown in the last column of the table. Price data are in 
Table 5. U.S. prices for soybeans, oil, and meal were taken to be equal to $176, $441, and 
$145 per mt, respectively. In the United States, the producer (farmer) price for soybeans 
was different from $176/mt because of LDPs. Because world trade patterns in 1998–99 
have not changed compared to the preceding crop year, with the United States, Argentina, 
and Brazil being net exporters and the ROW being a net importer of soybeans and all 
soybean products, the spatial price differentials were taken at the levels used in Moschini,  
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TABLE 5. Prices in the soybean complex ($/mt) 
            94–99 
 93–94a 94–95a 95–96a 96–97a 97–98a 98–99a (Average) 
Soybeans        
U.S. farm priceb  233 205 263 274 230 176 230 
U.S. Gulf, f.o.b.b  248 226 288 293 247 193 249 
Argentina, f.o.b.b  231 214 277 288 231 179 238 
Brazil, f.o.b.b  235 217 284 285 240 184 242 
Rotterdam, c.i.f.b  259 248 304 307 259 225 269 
        
Soybean meal        
U.S. (Decatur), 
44%b,d 
199 167 248 286 193 145 208 
Brazil, 44–45% 
f.o.b.b,d  
182 172 256 289 201 150 214 
Argentina, (pell.) 
f.o.b.b  
174 151 233 257 174 130 189 
Rotterdam, c.i.f. 
(Argentina 
44%–45%)c,d 
202 184 256 278 197 150 213 
Rotterdam, c.i.f. 
(Brazil 48%)c,d 
211 194 266 293 212 161 225 
        
Soybean oil        
U.S. (Decatur)c  596 605 550 504 571 441 534 
U.S. (Decatur)b 595 606 545 496 569 438 531 
U.S. Gulf, f.o.b.c   643 569 527 622 471 566 
Brazil, f.o.b.c  546 629 540 518 618 456 552 
Brazil, f.o.b.b 539 608 537 514 608 452 544 
Argentina, f.o.b.c  545 625 540 517 617 456 551 
Argentina, f.o.b.b 543 623 533 515 614 453 548 
Rotterdam, f.o.b.c  580 642 575 536 633 483 574 
a
 Fiscal years: October–September. 
b
 Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 2000a. 
c
 Source: Oil World 2000. 
d
 Percentage refers to protein content 
 
Lapan, and Sobolevsky (2000, p. 46), who analyzed the issue for 1997–98. Argentine and 
Brazilian differentials are set equal to those of South America in Moschini, Lapan, and 
Sobolevsky (2000) because both regions’ free-on-board (f.o.b.) prices for soybeans and 
soybean products are very close to each other (Table 5).  
Separately, the recent USDA report on agriculture in Brazil and Argentina (Schneph, 
Dohlman, and Bolling 2001) supported the $30/mt soybean transportation cost estimate 
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between the United States and the ROW and at least a $10/mt U.S. transportation cost 
advantage over Argentina and Brazil due to distance and higher insurance costs. See  
Table 6 for individual transportation cost values. 
Demand 
The assumption is that, in a region with heterogeneous preferences with respect to 
GM and non-GM crops, soybean demand will be differentiated. In soybean oil, detection 
of GMOs depends on the degree of the oil’s refinement. Still, some concerned food 
manufacturers, such as baby food and E.U. producers, have recently expressed their in-
tention to voluntarily procure GM-free ingredients in order to avoid their customers’ 
concerns, retain their market shares, and avoid biotech labeling requirements (Lin, 
Chambers, and Harwood 2000). In view of that evidence, soybean oil is also modeled as 
a differentiated product in the ROW. The current situation with soybean meal is one 
where countries have no legislation concerning GM animal feed, and biotech soybean 
meal is widely used by animal stock producers all over the world, including Japan, which 
represents the largest niche market for non-GM soybeans at present. However, feed label-
ing legislation is being drafted in the European Union and elsewhere and can be imposed 
in the near future. For now, demand for meal is not differentiated and is calibrated ac-
cordingly. 
In order to solve for the five parameters of the differentiated demand system (either 
for soybeans or oil), we need to specify five relationships involving these parameters. As  
 
TABLE 6. Transportation costs ($/mt) 
k=0,1 m = B m = O m = M 
,
k
m RUt  30 60 30 
,
k
m RAt  40 70 40 
,
k
m RZt  40 70 40 
,
k
m UAt  30 60 30 
,
k
m UZt  30 60 30 
,
k
m AZt  27 47 27 
Notes: 
,
k
m ijt denotes transportation cost between regions i and j for variety k of product m. B, O, and M 
stand for beans, oil, and meal; R, U, A, and Z stand for ROW, U.S., Argentina, and Brazil. 
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no mass segregation of RR and conventional soybeans has taken place in the 1998–
99reference year, we can assume, as discussed earlier, that in that year, 0 0Q =  and 
1 0 1
1 1Q a cp b p= + − . Hence, for the observed total quantity demanded ˆQ  and price pˆ , it 
must be that 
 
2
0
1 1
0 0
ˆ
ˆ
ca cQ a b p
b b
 
= + − −   . (50) 
Now, consider the case when 0p  falls from the choke level 0p  so that 0 1 ˆp p p= = . 
First, we can assume that the fraction of the total demand that is “indifferent” at these 
prices is ( )ˆ 0,1σ ∈ , to obtain 
 
1 1
0 1 0 1
ˆ( )
ˆ
ˆ( ) ( 2 )
a b c p
a a b b c p
σ
− −
=
+ − + −
. (51) 
Secondly, the total demand can be assumed to have increased because of this price 
reduction by a factor of ˆk  with respect to the total demand at prices 0 ˆ,p p  in the refer-
ence year: 
 ( )0 1 0 1 ˆ ˆˆˆ2 , 1a a b b c p kQ k+ − + − = ≥ . (52) 
Finally, we bring elasticity assumptions to bear. In the reference year, the observed 
own-price demand elasticity at price pˆ is 
 
2
1
0
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
UU c pb
b Qε
 
= − −   . (53) 
Also, assume that the own-price conventional demand elasticity at 0 1 ˆp p p= =  is 00εˆ : 
 
00
0
0 0
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ( )
pb
a b c p
ε = −
− −
. (54) 
The solution of the system (50)−(54) and the resulting restrictions on the parameters of 
the demand system are discussed further in Appendix B. 
The parameters of undifferentiated demands are calibrated as follows: 
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ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ(1 ),
ˆ
UU UU Qa Q b
p
ε ε= − = − . (55) 
The following values of parameters were chosen for both beans and oil: ˆ 0.5σ = , ˆ 1.05k = , 
and 00ˆ 4.5ε = −  (see Appendix B for more explanations). In all regions and for all prod-
ucts, ˆ 0.4UUε = −  (Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000). 
Supply 
All supply function parameters, unless explicitly discussed in this section, are as-
signed their values according to the findings and assumptions of Moschini, Lapan, and 
Sobolevsky (2000), with Brazil and Argentina assigned the South American values. Cali-
brated parameters are obtained using specifications (20)−(25). In line with Moschini, 
Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000, the unit seed cost δω  is set at {45, 40, 40, 40}.7 The 
$45/ha U.S. cost comes from Table 7. In Argentina, conventional soybean seeds sold for 
$8–$10/bag in 1998 (Table 8). In per-hectare terms, it is at most $30 before taxes or $36 
after the 21 percent tax charged to farmers. On the other hand, Schneph, Dohlman, and 
Bolling (2001) provide a $44/ha estimate for Argentina and a $41/ha estimate for the 
Southern part of Brazil. Therefore, we set δω  = 40 in Argentina and Brazil and assume 
the same for the ROW. RR seed monopolist’s markup is set to µ  = {0.4, 0.2, 0.2. 0.2}. 
The 0.4 U.S. estimate is the result of the $6 per bag technology fee charged by Monsanto 
(Table 7). In Argentina, Monsanto does not charge an explicit technology fee and is lim-
ited to collecting the value of the RR technology via agreements with Argentine seed 
companies (U.S. Government Accounting Office 2000). The situation is aggravated by 
the fact that a large share of seed is not purchased via commercial channels. From Table 
9, one would conservatively assume that at least 50 percent of soybean seed planted in 
Argentina is not commercially purchased, implying that the average markup in Argentina 
is at best µ  = 0.2. Intellectual property rights protection is unlikely to be better in Brazil 
or the ROW, and therefore we set µ  = 0.2 in these two regions as well. 
The cost savings due to RR technology parameter π∆  has been estimated at $15/ha 
for the United States. As Table 7 illustrates, following the introduction of competitively 
priced RR weed control systems, the prices for competing herbicides, especially those 
used for conventional soybeans, have declined over the last two years in the United  
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TABLE 7. Estimated costs of soybean production in Iowa, 2000 ($/acre, conventional 
tillage, soybeans following corn, assuming 45 bu/acre yield) 
 Conventional RRa RRb 
Pre-harvest machinery 22.06 22.06 22.06 
    
Seedc 18.00 18.00 18.00 
Technology feed - 7.20 7.20 
Herbicide 25.97 15.38 10.21 
Fertilizer and other intermed. inputs 35.75 35.75 35.75 
Interest 5.43 5.22 4.89 
    
Harvest machinery 20.30 20.30 20.30 
Labor 18.99 18.99 18.99 
Land 120.00 120.00 120.00 
    
Total 266.50 262.90 257.40 
    
RR cost reduction $/acre  3.60 9.10 
   $/hectare  8.90 22.49 
Source: Author’s adaptation of Iowa State University Extension budgets (ISU Weed Science 2001 for 
herbicide costs; Duffy and Smith 2000 for the rest). 
a
 Based on herbicide treatment consisting of 48 oz/acre of Roundup Ultra and 5 lbs/acre of ammonium 
sulphate. 
b
 Based on herbicide treatment consisting of 32 oz/acre of Roundup Ultra and 3 lbs/acre of ammonium 
sulphate, with no adjustment for labor and preharvest machinery costs to reflect the savings of reduced 
treatment. 
c
 $15.00 per 50-lb bag.  Conventional tillage requires 1.2 bags/acre. 
d
 $6.00 per 50-lb bag (average, due to various promotions/discounts). 
 
 
TABLE 8. Soybean seed prices per 50-lb bag, before taxes, 1998 
 Conventional Seeds RR Seeds 
United States $13-17 $20-23a 
Argentina $8-10 $12-15 
Source: U.S. Government Accounting Office 2000. 
Notes: No taxes on seed purchases are levied in Illinois and Iowa; Argentine farmers’ net tax burden is 
about 12%. 
a Includes technology fee. 
 
 
TABLE 9. Sources of soybean seeds, 1998 
Estimated Percentage of Total Soybean Acreage Planted  
Source of Seeds United States Argentina 
   
Commercial sales 80-85 28-50 
Farmer-saved 15-20 25-35 
Black market sales 0-2 25-50 
Source: U.S. Government Accounting Office 2000. 
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States. For 2000, it is estimated that the cost savings of using RR technology lies between 
$8.90 and $22.49 per hectare and therefore we conservatively set it at $15. Because plant-
ing conditions and technologies in Brazil and Argentina are very close to those in the 
United States, as manifested by very similar soybean production yields, π∆  is expected 
to be the same in these regions if RR pricing conditions were the same. Given that the RR 
seed markup coefficient in Brazil and Argentina is one-half that in the United States, 
these two regions gain an additional $8/ha (δω =40 times the markup differential 0.2) for 
the total π∆ =23, based on π α δωµ∆ = −  (assuming 0β = ; see equation (22)). Because 
the ROW yield is only two-thirds of the yield in the other three regions, it is expected to 
gain proportionally at $10/ha under U.S. pricing conditions. And, because the RR seed 
markup coefficient in the ROW is one-half that in the United States, the additional advan-
tage of $8/ha results in the π∆ =18. To summarize, π∆  = {15, 23, 23, 18}, and the steps 
of its estimation are illustrated in Table 10. 
The elasticity of land supply with respect to soybean prices ψ  remains 0.8 in the 
United States and 0.6 in the ROW (Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000). The value of 
ψ =1.0 previously estimated for South America still applies to Brazil, but not to Argen-
tina. Brazil has vast areas of undeveloped arable land in its Center-West and North 
regions that can serve and have served as engines of soybean production growth 
(Schneph, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). In Argentina, much like in the United States, 
growth in soybean areas can be achieved only by substitution. Therefore, parameter ψ  is 
set equally in the United States and Argentina and, overall, ψ = {0.8, 1.0, 0.8, 0.6}. 
The technical coefficients Mγ and Oγ are set to their world average values for the 
1998–99 crop year; that is, Mγ =0.7985 and Oγ =0.1810.  
 
TABLE 10. Estimation of parameter    
 United States Brazil Argentina ROW 
π∆  subject to µ = {0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4} 15 15 15 10 
µ∆  differential with the United States 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
δω  seed cost 45 40 40 40 
π∆  final estimate 15 23 23 18 
Note: The technical coefficients Mγ and Oγ are set to their world average values for the 1998–99 crop 
year; that is, Mγ =0.7985 and Oγ =0.1810.  
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Segregation Costs 
Lin, Chambers, and Harwood (2000) extend the segregation cost estimates available 
for specialty crops grown in the United States (Bender et al. 1999) to non-GM soybeans. 
They project that for U.S. grain handlers, segregating non-GM soybeans may cost from 
$6.60 to $19.80/mt (depending on whether handling process patterns for high oil corn or 
the ones for STS [sulfonylurea-tolerant soybeans] were used).8 Bullock and Desquilbet 
(2002) provide an observable segregation cost estimate of $11.00/mt based on the Japa-
nese GMO-free soybean importer premiums and premiums to farmers shipping non-GM 
soybeans to elevators near the Illinois River. These estimates refer only to grain handlers’ 
costs, covering country elevators, subterminals, and export elevators. Possible farm-level 
and additional handling and transportation costs beyond export elevators are not taken 
into account in these estimates, which is consistent with our definition of ϕ . To study the 
effects of segregation costs in the given range, the model is solved with the following 
alternative segregation costs set equally in all regions (in addition to ϕ  = {0, 0, 0, 0}): ϕ  
= {6.6, 6.6, 6.6, 6.6}, {13.2, 13.2, 13.2, 13.2}, and {19.8, 19.8, 19.8, 19.8}. These cost 
levels will be often referred to as low, medium, and high. 
Loan Deficiency Payments in the United States 
In 1998–99, consumer and producer soybean prices were not the same in the United 
States. The actual price support activity in the U.S. soybean sector is presented in Table 
11. While in the 1997–98 crop year only 10 percent of soybean production enjoyed price 
support, in 1998–99, support covered 90 percent of the crop, of which 78 percentage 
points received LDPs, and 0.5 percentage points were delivered to the CCC on the loan’s  
 
TABLE 11. Loan deficiency payments and price support loan activity, 1997–99 
 LDPb Loan Activityb 
Yeara 
Loan 
Rate$/mt 
Total 
Quantity 
Total 
Payment 
Quantity 
Under 
Loan 
Repay-
ment 
Quantity 
Mkt Gain 
Quantity 
Mkt Gain 
Amount 
1997 193.25 0.00 0.0 7.20 7.02 1.44 15.8 
1998 193.25 58.04 883.5 9.19 8.81 8.63 338.2 
1999 193.25 63.09 2,106.6 7.78 4.29 4.26 110.7 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 2000b. 
a
 Crop year: September–August. 
b
 Quantities in million mt; payments/amounts in million dollars. 
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maturity, leaving 11.5 percentage points in marketing loan gains. This means that ap-
proximately 90 percent of the 1998 U.S. soybean crop was sold by farmers at the loan 
rate of $193/mt and not at the average 1998–99 U.S. farm price of $176/mt. A similar 
situation emerged in 1999, when U.S. soybean production reached 71.9 million mt and 
about 98 percent of it relied on government price support. 
Therefore, assuming that all farmers make rational economic decisions, the average 
U.S. producer price is set at $193/mt in 1998–99, and in scenarios in which the U.S. price 
support program is assumed to remain in force it is assumed that 193LDPp =  given that 
the average national loan rate in 2000 and 2001 remained at $193.25. 
Calibration Summary 
The summary of all parameters and their values used for model calibration purposes 
and for solving the world soybean complex partial equilibrium defined by equations (34)–
(47) is provided in Table 12. Some parameter values are borrowed from Moschini, Lapan, 
and Sobolevsky (2000), who estimate them for a simpler soybean complex model with no 
differentiated markets and no segregated supply lines. These parameter values are believed 
to apply in the current model because there was either no additional data found to challenge 
them or the additional data confirmed their validity. Other parameter values were amended 
as discussed earlier, and several new parameters were added. 

Results 
The model described by equations (34)–(47) was solved for several parameter values and 
policy scenarios. As stipulated by equation (47), only the ROW is assumed to have con-
sumers with differentiated tastes for soybeans and soybean oil. Consumers in the United 
States, Argentina, and Brazil do not differentiate between conventional and RR soybean 
products and consume the variety that is cheaper in equilibrium. 
Several scenarios are of interest in this setting. First, we study the implications of in-
troducing the RR technology in the soybean complex that is free of any government 
intervention (Scenerio 1). Regional adoption rates, prices, production and consumption 
patterns, trade flows, and welfare associated with this equilibrium are discussed. Scenario 2 
looks at how regions are affected if the United States were to pursue a domestic price sup-
port policy to help its farmers in the form of LDPs and market loans. This scenario is 
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TABLE 12. Model’s parameters and their values 
Values 
Parameter Description U.S. Brazil Argentina ROW 
ˆ
UU
Bε  
Own-price non-segregated bean  
demand elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
ˆ
UU
Oε  
Own-price non-segregated oil  
demand elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
ˆ
UU
Mε  
Own-price non-segregated meal 
demand elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
00
ˆBε  
Own-price conventional bean  
demand elasticity    -4.5 
00
ˆOε  
Own-price conventional oil demand 
elasticitya    -4.5 
ˆ
Bk  
Total bean demand increase due to 
price decreasea    1.05 
ˆ
Ok  
Total oil demand increase due to 
price decreasea    1.05 
ˆBσ  
Share of “indifferent” bean demand 
in totala    0.5 
ˆOσ  
Share of “indifferent” oil demand in 
totala    0.5 
ψ  Elasticity of land supply w.r.t.  
soybean price 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.6 
η  Elasticity of yield w.r.t. soybean 
price 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
δω  Unit seed cost 45.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 
π∆  Producer unit profit change due to RR technology 15.0 23.0 23.0 18.0 
r  Producer rent share in average profit 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
µ  Innovator-monopolist markup on RR 
seed price 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 
β  Coefficient of yield increase due to RR technology 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
LDPp  Soybean farmer LDP/loan price  193.0    
ϕ  Segregation cost per mt 0.0 
6.6 
13.2 
19.8 
0.0 
6.6 
13.2 
19.8 
0.0 
6.6 
13.2 
19.8 
0.0 
6.6 
13.2 
19.8 
a
 See text for details. 
 
important because the United States has a history of providing sizable price support to its 
soybean producers. Scenario 3 is the first in the series of government ban scenarios consid-
ered next. It simulates the situation in which the ROW introduces a ban on RR soybean 
production at home. The ROW region includes the European Union, Japan, and several 
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other countries that have already adopted regulations prohibiting production of unapproved 
biotech crops that led to a de facto ban on all biotech production in the region. Scenario 4 
looks at the same production ban but in Brazil. To date, Brazil has not adopted RR soy-
beans—despite their wide popularity in neighboring Argentina—and is seen as trying to 
differentiate itself from other soybean exporting nations by establishing itself as a GMO-
free soybean region. The next two scenarios are variations on the same theme. Scenario 5 
investigates the effects of simultaneous RR production bans in Brazil and the ROW, and 
Scenario 6 adds an import ban on sales of RR products in the ROW in addition to produc-
tion bans. Finally, we discuss the separate question of the economic benefits of RR 
technology under alternative market structures. Changes in market structure are realized by 
changing the behavior of the innovator-monopolist that sells RR seed. 
All aforementioned scenarios except for the last one are solved for four distinct lev-
els of segregation costs in order to provide initial sensitivity assessment of results with 
respect to this variable. In addition, we obtain a solution for the full adoption scenario 
( iρ =1, i = U, A, Z, R) that arises when no segregation technology is available yet, so that 
no soybeans can be guaranteed to be GMO-free and the differentiated demand for con-
ventional product varieties is driven to zero by prohibitively high (“choke”) prices. The 
regional demand functions for this scenario are defined in (11) and (14), and supply func-
tions satisfy (24). The benchmark for all welfare calculations is the pre-innovation 
scenario in which the RR soybean is not yet available ( iρ =0, i = U, A, Z, R), such that 
demands are described by equations (8) and (14), while supplies are described by (24). In 
each of these two special scenarios with only one soybean variety produced and con-
sumed in equilibrium, the equilibrium trade and market conditions are still described by 
(34)–(47), with some of the equations collapsed into trivial identities. 
Consumer and producer surplus and the innovator-monopolist profit are computed and 
reported in all regions. Specifically, if 0
,
ˆ j ip  is the equilibrium undifferentiated pre-
innovation price for product j in region i, and 0
,j ip  and 1,j ip are equilibrium prices of 
conventional and RR varieties in the differentiated market, then, setting the reservation 
price 1 0
, ,
ˆ ˆj i j ip p≡ , the change in consumer surplus is defined as follows (Just, Hueth, and 
Schmitz 1982): 
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Consumer surplus changes in undifferentiated markets are computed in the standard way: 
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Now, let ˆiπ  be the pre-innovation equilibrium average unit profit that satisfies (23), and 
iπ  be the differentiated market equilibrium average unit profit that satisfies (29). Then the 
change in producer surplus between pre-innovation and differentiated market scenarios is 
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where Li is the land allocation function (24). The innovator-monopolist’s profit is com-
puted simply as  
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where iρ  is the equilibrium rate of adoption in region i. The total change in welfare is 
defined as 
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One important result common to all scenarios will be discussed in the subsequent 
parts of this section. That is, the direction of trade flows, when flows are nonzero, does 
not change in any equilibrium from what is observed in the pre-innovation market. Trade 
in all products and in all varieties flows from the United States, Argentina, and Brazil to 
the ROW except for some instances when particular regions find themselves in autarky in 
a particular product variety. These exceptions will be noted explicitly. All results are 
shown in the tables in Appendix C. 
38 / Sobolevsky, Moschini, and Lapan 
 
Scenario 1: No Loan Deficiency Payments9 in the United States 
Absent any government intervention, the soybean complex is subject only to the mar-
ket distortion that comes from the U.S.-based monopolist selling RR seed to all regions. 
We find a unique equilibrium solution for this scenario for each of the four selected levels 
of segregation costs. Equilibrium adoption rates, consumer, producer, monopolist, and total 
welfare changes, as well as production and trade flow results, are provided in Table C.1 of 
Appendix C. Equilibrium price and consumption data for soybeans and soybean oil of both 
varieties, as well as for soybean meal, are provided in Table C.2. 
As the world moves to the full adoption of the cost-saving RR technology, U.S. soy-
bean prices fall by 4 percent, oil by 7 percent, and meal by 1 percent, and prices in all 
other regions decline as well, as shown in the “no segregation technology” set of results 
in Table C.1. U.S. soybean supply falls because the region’s new technology cost savings 
are the smallest among the four regions, due to the enforcement of IPRs, and are not high 
enough to offset the price decline. Other regions’ supplies grow. Consumption increases 
in all regions but the ROW, where GMO-conscious consumers cut down on the consump-
tion of inferior RR soybeans and soybean oil. Each region and the world in general 
benefit by moving to the complete adoption, with the worldwide efficiency gain esti-
mated at $1.56 billion. This is 25 percent lower than the worldwide gain estimated using 
the Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky (2000) soybean model with this paper’s parametric 
assumptions. The lower welfare gain is explained by the negative value RR soybeans 
generate consumers in the ROW who prefer the conventional variety. Consumers capture 
39 percent of the welfare gain, while the innovator-monopolist captures another 53 per-
cent. Farmers in the United States lose for the same reason the region’s supply decreases, 
while farmers in other regions gain. Note that consumers in the ROW gain despite the 
baseline assumption that 50 percent of them would prefer the conventional soybean and 
soy oil variety if it were sold at prices equal to prices of non-segregated (blend) products 
in the reference year. Clearly, this is a net effect of GMO-conscious consumers losing 
from prohibitively high prices for conventional products and GMO-indifferent consumers 
benefiting from lower prices. 
Depriving the ROW consumers of exercising the choice to consume conventional 
products is clearly not the welfare-maximizing solution, as evidenced from the scenario 
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with segregation costs set to $19.8/mt worldwide, or 11 percent of the price received by 
U.S. farmers growing conventional soybeans. However, the increase in welfare gain rela-
tive to the no-segregation scenario is only 1 percent. In other words, the costs of 
segregation “burn” most of the additional gain because of conventional product availability. 
The high-segregation-cost equilibrium, likely the first to emerge at the early stages of 
introduction of the new segregation technology, is very similar to the no-segregation-
technology one because the share of conventional soybeans is a mere 2 percent in world-
wide production and 23 percent in total soybean demand in the ROW. The United States 
is the only region producing both varieties, while all other regions specialize in produc-
tion of RR soybeans. The fact that the United States produces conventional soybeans 
rather than the ROW with its GMO-conscious consumers is explained by the relatively 
smaller cost savings in the United States associated with the RR technology that make 
U.S. farmers more easily attracted to growing non-GM soybeans. In equilibrium, the U.S. 
adoption rate for RR soybeans is 95 percent. Compared to the pre-innovation benchmark, 
RR prices fall; conventional producer prices fall, too, but conventional consumer prices 
increase because of segregation costs. 
Now, we trace the changes in equilibrium prices, quantities, and welfare as segrega-
tion costs start to fall. The decline in these costs is shared between the conventional 
variety’s consumers and producers thanks to the fact that demands are not completely 
inelastic. As illustrated by medium- and low-segregation-cost scenarios in Table C.2, 
conventional consumer prices fall and conventional producer prices increase as segrega-
tion costs decline. This benefits ROW consumers and U.S. producers whose share of 
conventional soybean production increases to 30 percent when segregation costs are low. 
The United States remains the only producer of the conventional variety, with the world-
wide share of the conventional soybean market growing to 13 percent. As more 
production shifts toward conventional soybeans, the world’s RR supply decreases, caus-
ing RR prices to increase. Therefore, producer surplus improves in all four regions and 
consumer surplus in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina, where only RR products are 
consumed, falls. 
In the zero-segregation-cost equilibrium, which is useful to analyze because it iso-
lates the RR technology impacts from those caused by segregation costs, the share of the 
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conventional soybean market reaches 17 percent. Brazil finds it profitable to grow con-
ventional soybeans but allocates only 1 percent of total soybean land to them. The U.S. 
adoption rate is a low 62 percent and the region finds itself in an autarky equilibrium in 
the RR market, exporting only the conventional variety to the ROW. As a result, RR 
prices in the other regions fall compared to the low-segregation-cost scenario under the 
pressure of weakened RR import demand from the ROW. The high autarkic RR prices in 
the United States finally help U.S. farmers to benefit from the RR technology—the only 
simulated scenario when this happens. Conversely, the seed monopolist benefits the least 
in this scenario because of a large worldwide share of conventional soybean production 
and captures 38 percent of the total welfare gain. Notably, the monopolist’s profit in gen-
eral is positively correlated with the level of segregation costs, as higher costs lead to 
higher RR adoption rates in equilibrium. This sets the monopolist at odds with the inter-
ests of both conventional and RR soybean producers who benefit from higher prices in 
the lower-segregation-cost equilibria. 
Scenario 2: Loan Deficiency Payments in the United States 
Assume now that U.S. farmers receive LDPs of $193/mt both in the counterfactual 
market equilibria and the pre-innovation benchmark (supply equations (32) and (33) ap-
ply in this case). Results are shown in Tables C.3 and C.4 of Appendix C. The United 
States does not produce the conventional variety because LDPs equate farmer prices for 
conventional and RR soybeans and create a permanent incentive to specialize in the RR 
variety. Brazil emerges as the only producer and exporter of conventional products to the 
ROW in all three positive segregation cost cases, with the United States, Brazil, and  
Argentina exporting RR products. In the zero-segregation-cost scenario, Brazil allocates a 
high 49 percent of its soybean land to the conventional variety and does not export RR 
beans and oil. Argentina, too, dedicates 50 percent of its total production to conventional 
soybeans when segregation costs are zero. As in Scenario 1, the world in general and 
each region in particular benefit from the complete adoption of the RR technology. Simi-
larly, the differentiated market equilibrium scenarios yield even higher overall gains, 
which means that the theoretically possible immiserizing growth, discussed earlier, does 
not take place. 
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Relative to the pre-innovation benchmark, U.S. farmers, unlike in Scenario 1, are 
guaranteed to benefit from the RR technology because the LDP price is binding and the 
gain stems from the cost-reducing nature of RR innovation. This price distortion, how-
ever, depresses the RR prices worldwide to the degree that farmers in Brazil and 
Argentina lose whenever segregation costs are positive and are able to gain only in the 
zero segregation cost case when 50 percent of their production is in the higher-priced 
conventional market. 
Beyond that, the LDP scenario offers the same welfare and price movement patterns 
as the no-LDP scenario when segregation costs start to decline. This decline causes con-
ventional consumer prices to decline. Conventional producer prices increase, the RR 
market share declines, and this drives the RR prices up. The net effect on the ROW con-
sumer surplus is positive, but consumers in other regions where only the cheaper RR 
products are purchased see their welfare gains lessened. Producer surplus in Argentina, 
Brazil, and the ROW improves with lower segregation costs but is unaffected in the 
United States where farmers receive a fixed LDP price. 
The objective of the price subsidy in the United States is to help U.S. farmers. How-
ever, its overall effect on U.S. and world welfare can be negative. The results in Tables 
C.1 and C.3 can be subtracted from each other to show changes in welfare when LDPs 
are introduced in the soybean complex with differentiated tastes and potentially segre-
gated markets. These welfare changes are presented in Table C.5. 
The U.S. price support puts a downward pressure on prices worldwide and benefits 
consumers across the world. Obviously, it benefits U.S. farmers. Also, it benefits the  
innovator-monopolist by improving the worldwide adoption of the RR technology. How-
ever, it hurts Brazilian, Argentine, and ROW producers who see their competitive 
positions worsened. It also puts pressure on the U.S. government budget: the amount of 
the subsidy exceeds 30 percent of the world’s gross welfare gain from introducing the RR 
technology in the marketplace. As a result, the LDP scenario is welfare reducing in the 
United States, despite the fact that the region’s consumers and producers both benefit. 
Brazil and Argentina lose in this LDP scenario relative to the no-LDP one, but the ROW 
emerges as the only region that benefits from the introduction of LDPs at all levels of 
segregation costs. If not for the market power of the innovator-monopolist, LDPs would 
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hurt the world’s welfare for all levels of segregation costs. But in fact, LDPs are found 
globally welfare improving at the low ($6.6/mt) level of segregation costs. This is be-
cause monopoly pricing in the seed market results in a less-than-optimal adoption of 
efficient technology, whereas the output subsidy in the form of LDPs corrects this under-
adoption and puts the industry in the second-best equilibrium. 
Scenario 3: Production Ban on Roundup Ready Products in the Rest of the World 
In this and the next two sections, we provide estimates of how regional welfare and 
trade are affected by protectionist government policies that are already observed in the 
soybean world or that are being contemplated and may be implemented in the future. 
Scenario 3 looks at the measure that the European Union and several Asian countries that 
are part of the ROW region currently have in place—the ban on production of RR soy-
beans and products. Results in Table C.6 are provided both for the LDP and for no-LDP 
scenarios in the United States. They show that under the medium and high segregation 
costs, the ROW benefits from the ban.  
The ban on RR production in the ROW results in the situation of complete regional 
specialization at positive levels of segregation costs. Because the ROW is restricted to 
produce only the conventional variety, which allows it to meet its domestic demand for 
conventional soybean products, the United States, Brazil, and Argentina specialize in the 
RR variety and export it to the ROW. No segregation technology is needed in this case; 
de facto segregation costs are zero in equilibrium and the level of segregation costs postu-
lated by the technology does not affect the equilibrium solution. 
In the zero-segregation-cost case, lower conventional prices generate more demand 
for conventional products than ROW farmers can handle, and the United States emerges 
as the second region producing conventional soybeans by allocating 4 percent of its land 
to it. At all levels of segregation costs, all agents benefit relative to the pre-innovation 
benchmark. However, if LDPs are introduced, ROW producers stand to lose relative to 
the pre-innovation benchmark because the region’s conventional prices fall, whereas 
technology remains the same. The decrease in the conventional prices is observed for 
soybeans and soybean meal, and conventional soybean oil prices increase in comparison 
to the pre-innovation benchmark. This decrease in the conventional soybean price be-
cause of the introduction of RR technology was not observed in other scenarios. It is due 
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to the particular nature of the ban, in which the region that consumes the conventional 
variety is allowed to specialize in its production at no additional segregation cost, while 
other regions provide cheap exports of the RR variety to some ROW consumers willing 
to buy it. 
Comparison to unregulated production scenarios from Tables C.1 and C.3 is pro-
vided in Table C.7. It shows that RR production ban in the ROW appears to improve the 
ROW’s welfare in the $35–$55 million range if segregation costs are medium to high. 
The welfare gain is driven by the positive change in consumer surplus thanks to the lower 
conventional product prices (driven down by zero segregation costs) under the ban. It 
more than offsets the corresponding negative change in producer surplus and happens 
only at sufficiently high levels of segregation costs that depress consumer surpluses in the 
unregulated equilibrium. The positive effect of the ban on the ROW holds in both the no-
LDP and LDP scenarios. Whenever the ban benefits the ROW, it also benefits Brazil and 
Argentina but hurts the Unites States, reducing its welfare by $80–$90 million, primarily 
because of forgone innovator-monopolist profit. 
Scenario 4: Production Ban on Roundup Ready Products in Brazil 
To date, Brazil has not adopted RR soybeans because of the government’s position 
on the GMO issue, which is essentially tantamount to a production ban. This can be ex-
plained by Brazil’s interest in avoiding segregation costs in order to gain a competitive 
advantage selling conventional soybeans and soybean products to the ROW. Results for 
this ban scenario are summarized in Tables C.8 and C.9, where both the no-LDP and 
LDP scenarios are considered. It appears that the ban on RR production in Brazil does not 
benefit the region overall, although it benefits the country’s farmers. 
The ban on production of RR soybeans in Brazil results in the complete regional 
specialization in production at medium and high segregation costs, with the United States 
and Argentina producing only the RR variety and exporting it to the ROW, which also 
produces only RR beans. Under the low and zero segregation costs, the United States 
begins to produce both varieties, with conventional production being exclusively ex-
ported to the ROW. 
As in the no-ban Scenario 1, introduction of RR technology results in higher conven-
tional prices for consumers and lower RR prices. Because Brazil specializes in producing 
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conventional beans, it does not incur segregation costs and therefore prices received by 
Brazilian farmers also increase relative to the pre-innovation benchmark. These higher 
prices benefit the region’s farmers but hurt its consumers, who in equilibrium consume 
the domestically grown and crushed conventional products despite having no differenti-
ated tastes.  
The same happens in the LDP scenario at positive segregation costs. When segrega-
tion costs are zero, Argentina joins Brazil in producing conventional soybeans, with the 
RR adoption rate at 52 percent. In this case, not only consumers but also producers show 
welfare losses relative to the pre-innovation benchmark as Brazil posts lower soybean 
and meal prices and higher oil prices. 
Welfare changes between the ban and no-ban scenarios are provided in Table C.9. It 
is clear that whereas at all positive levels of segregation costs, Brazilian farmers gain 
from the ban by switching to higher-priced conventional soybeans, the same switch in 
consumption due to the non-competitive pricing from potential RR imports hurts the re-
gion more and results in a net loss of welfare in the neighborhood of $100 million. This 
conclusion applies both to the no-LDP and LDP scenarios and to the zero-segregation-
cost case in which both consumer and producer welfare decline because of the ban. These 
findings suggest that Brazil does not have economic reasons to continue not adopting RR 
technology, and if it does continue to bar RR soybeans, then the reasons are either politi-
cal or related to a farmer lobby that benefits from the status quo. 
Scenario 5: Production Bans on Roundup Ready Products in Brazil and the Rest 
of the World 
What would happen if the ROW and Brazil banned RR production simultaneously? 
This logical extension of Scenarios 3 and 4 is summarized in Tables C.10 and C.11. Our 
results suggest that such simultaneous production bans are welfare reducing for both re-
gions implementing them and for the world in general. 
Both the no-LDP and LDP scenarios result in equilibria with full specialization in 
production and therefore segregation cost levels are irrelevant in determining equilib-
rium. Brazil and the ROW are forced to produce only conventional soybeans, with Brazil 
exporting to the ROW, and the United States and Argentina produce only RR soybeans 
and soybean products for domestic consumption and export to the ROW. 
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With two regions growing conventional soybeans, the size of the conventional soy-
bean sector proves to be quite large in equilibrium. As a result, equilibrium is 
characterized by equal conventional and RR soybean and oil prices in the ROW, with 17 
percent of the indifferent demand attributed to conventional soybeans and soybean oil at 
these prices in the no-LDP scenario. In general, all prices in this equilibrium are lower 
than their pre-innovation benchmark counterparts, implying that consumers gain from the 
RR technology in all regions and producers in Brazil and the ROW lose. 
A welfare comparison between the ban and no-ban scenarios is provided in Table 
C.11. The forced abundance of the conventional variety and a relative scarcity of the RR 
product imply that equilibrium conventional prices in the ban scenario are lower than 
their counterparts in the unregulated scenario, whereas RR prices are higher. As a result, 
only producers in Brazil and the ROW lose. All but the ROW consumers lose in all posi-
tive segregation cost scenarios, and Argentina emerges as the only region that benefits 
from the simultaneous RR production bans in Brazil and the ROW. Brazil loses approxi-
mately $260 million, while the ROW may lose between $80 and $170 million depending 
on the level of segregation costs. 
Scenario 6: Production and Import Bans on Roundup Ready Products in the Rest 
of the World 
Depending on the severity of GMO aversion in the European Union and other coun-
tries manifested in their official government regulations, the ROW may choose to ban 
any presence of crops and food products with biotech content on its territory. For the 
soybean complex this would mean that the ROW will ban any RR imports in addition to 
RR production, which will have dramatic consequences for production patterns in export-
ing regions as some of them will have to scale back on their adoption of RR technology. 
The impact of the RR import ban in addition to the RR production ban in the ROW is 
estimated in Table C.12. Results for the scenario when, in addition to ROW bans, Brazil 
bans RR production are provided in Table C.13. The welfare changes between the ban 
and no-ban scenarios in both cases are shown in Table C.14. In all tables, the effects of 
the import ban are illustrated using the no-LDP scenario only. 
First, we consider the case when Brazil does not ban RR production. Having no ex-
port destination for the RR soybeans and products, the Unites States, Argentina, and 
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Brazil each produce both varieties—RR for domestic consumption and conventional for 
export to the ROW. Depending on the level of segregation costs, the adoption rate for RR 
technology in the United States is 62–67 percent, in Brazil, 49–52 percent, and in Argen-
tina, 28–30 percent. The common feature of lower RR and higher conventional prices 
relative to the pre-innovation benchmark explains consumer surplus increases in the 
Unites States, Brazil, and Argentina as RR technology is introduced. ROW consumers 
experience very large losses of up to $1.5 billion when segregation costs are high because 
of the unavailability of the cheaper RR variety. This fact drives the overall welfare loss 
for the ROW as a result of the introduction of RR technology. Other regions gain despite 
the welfare losses by producers, and the world’s welfare improves in all but the high-
segregation-cost scenarios. 
Adding an RR production ban in Brazil changes the characteristics of the equilibrium 
only to the extent that Brazil experiences a loss of consumer surplus due to consumption 
of more expensive conventional products and an increase in the producer surplus due to 
specialization. However, unlike the ROW, Brazil’s overall welfare improves as compared 
to the pre-innovation benchmark. 
Welfare comparisons between the unregulated and ban scenarios show that all re-
gions lose overall as a result of the combined production and import ban in the ROW no 
matter whether Brazil introduces the RR production ban or not. The only benefiting par-
ties are consumers in unregulated regions and ROW producers at medium and high levels 
of segregation cost. 
Economic Benefits of Roundup Ready Technology Under Alternative Market 
Structures 
The fact that one of the players in the soybean complex is the innovator-monopolist 
producing RR seed raises a series of important questions about the role that the existing 
market power plays in determining equilibrium outcomes in differentiated markets. The 
new RR technology has been developed and patented in the United States by Monsanto, 
and the size of its spillover to world regions measured by their adoption rates ρ  depends, 
both in the present model and in real life, on the level of monopoly rents extracted from 
farmers. Of course, the competitive provision of the new technology is the most benefi-
cial. On the other hand, the present model relies on observed monopolistic behavior 
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instead of solving for the optimal behavior endogenously, leaving open the question of 
whether observed behavior is optimal and whether optimal behavior is attainable. 
To address these questions, we provide solutions to the soybean trade model de-
scribed by equations (34)–(47) for the three levels of the monopolist’s RR seed markup: 
µ ={0, 0, 0, 0}, µ ={0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4}, and µ  that maximizes the innovator-monopolist’s 
profit . Note that the baseline solutions to the model are obtained assuming µ ={0.4, 0.2, 
0.2, 0.2}. Results of these simulations are provided in Table C.15 for the specific level of 
segregation cost ($13.2/mt) and two no-LDP scenarios: unregulated and the RR produc-
tion ban in Brazil and the ROW simultaneously. 
The µ ={0, 0, 0, 0} case represents the competitive provision of RR technology 
worldwide. As shown in Table C.15, the United States is the only region producing both 
soybean varieties, while other regions specialize in the RR variety, in line with the base-
line equilibrium when µ ={0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2} (Table C.1). However, the U.S. rate of 
adoption increases from 90 percent to 95 percent because RR soybeans become more 
attractive, and the U.S. welfare gain is $400 million smaller as it is being reallocated to 
other regions. Overall, the world welfare gain increases by only 1 percent. Adoption rates 
in the simultaneous Brazil/ROW RR production ban do not change, as the United States 
and Argentina already have 100 percent adoption rates. 
If the innovator-monopolist were able to enforce IPRs equally in all parts of the 
world, the new technology could be sold at a markup µ ={0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4} based on 
what Monsanto currently charges in the United States. In that case, the monopolist’s 
profit would be $1.13 billion, which is $350 million higher than the baseline case. The 
welfare gains in other regions would be smaller, but the overall worldwide welfare loss 
relative to the baseline equilibrium would be only $2 million. 
What is the optimal markup? Table C.15 shows it for the scenario when both Brazil 
and the ROW impose a production ban on RR soybeans, which is the closest representation 
of the current situation in the soybean complex. Here we assume that the markup remains 
at 20 percent in Argentina where the enforcement of IPRs by Monsanto had little success. 
When the segregation cost is $13.2/mt, the estimated optimal markup is µ ={1.5, 0.0, 0.2, 
0.0}, which proves to be especially taxing for consumers because of higher production 
costs that result in higher equilibrium prices worldwide. The high 150 percent markup 
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arises in the United States because of the low conventional prices (they equal RR prices in 
this equilibrium with forced overproduction of the conventional variety and sizable con-
sumption by indifferent consumers) that also have to be reduced by the amount of 
segregation cost when evaluating relative profitability of the two varieties at the farm level. 
If segregation costs were zero, the optimal markup would be µ ={0.73, 0.0, 0.2, 0.0}, 33 
percentage points higher than currently observed in the United States. 
To summarize, the present model does not appear to be sensitive to small variations in 
the innovator-monopolist’s seed price markup around the baseline assumption. At the same 
time, the baseline assumption of µ ={0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2}, which is based on the monopolist’s 
currently observed behavior, is far from the optimal. Still, the optimal markup rates that are 
three to four times higher than the existing ones may be practically unattainable. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The results discussed in the previous section are based on several parametric 
assumptions and a number of parameter estimates. Specifically, assumptions were made 
with respect to the three parameters that describe differentiated demands for soybeans 
and soybean oil in the ROW: the share of “indifferent” demand σˆ , the coefficient of the 
total demand increase due to conventional and RR price equalization ˆk , and the own-
price elasticity of conventional demand 00εˆ . Among the estimated parameters, the ones 
with perhaps the least consensus in the research literature regarding their values are the 
own-price elasticities of demand for non-segregated soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean 
meal ˆUUε ; the elasticity of land supply with respect to soybean price ψ ; and the coeffi-
cient of yield increase due to the RR technology β . Needless to say, all parameters, 
including the ones just mentioned, were researched in every detail, and their proposed 
values are believed to provide as close a representation of the world soybean market as 
exists today and as it most likely will look in the near future.  
Nevertheless, the sensitivity analysis of key parameters is necessary to evaluate the 
robustness of conclusions that emerged from the model’s results and to understand 
whether these conclusions are subject to change should the model’s parameter values 
change. Two parameters were already indirectly subjected to the sensitivity analysis 
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when the model was solved for four levels of segregation costs and when the effect of 
alternative market structures was studied by varying the innovator-monopolist’s seed 
price markup. Therefore, no additional sensitivity analysis for parameters ϕ  and µ  will 
be offered here. 
The six parameters and their base and suggested alternative values that form this sec-
tion’s analysis are summarized in Table 13. To keep the scope of the analysis manageable, 
we restrict the sensitivity discussion to the no-LDP scenario with the $13.2/mt segregation 
cost in each region. The tables in Appendix D provide equilibrium adoption and welfare 
results for the model’s simulations under the new parameter values. Each table contains 
results for the “free trade” scenario (scenario in which regions do not implement any pro-
duction or trade bans) and for all ban scenarios discussed earlier. Increases and decreases in 
each parameter value are implemented ceteris paribus (that is, holding all other parameters 
at their base values). In the tables, the model’s results for the base values of parameters also 
are shown for ease of comparison. One ancillary outcome of the sensitivity analysis that we 
carried out was to demonstrate that the soybean complex can have multiple trade and mar-
ket equilibria because of the nonconvexity introduced by the discontinuous constant 
segregation cost function. Finally, we discuss how different assumptions regarding the 
transportation costs between Argentina and Brazil may affect the equilibrium solution for 
Brazil’s RR production ban scenario. Recall that in this equilibrium, Brazilian consumers 
purchase conventional soybean and soybean oil variety despite the fact that that they do  
 
TABLE 13. Base and alternative values of parameters used in sensitivity analysis 
Parameter Base Value Alternative Value 1 Alternative Value 2 
ˆ
UUε  {-0.4,-0.4,-0.4,-0.4} Base value × ½ Base value × 2 
ψ  {0.8, 1.0, 0.8, 0.6} Base value × ½ Base value × 2 
β  {0, 0, 0, 0} Base value + 0.02 – 
σˆ  -4.5 Base value ×  Base values × 1  
ˆk  1.05 Base value - 0.025 Base value + 0.025 
00εˆ  0.5 Base value ×  Base values × 1  
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not have differentiated tastes. We show that it is possible that they choose to import RR 
products in equilibrium, although this probably would not be allowed as it violates the 
purpose of a production ban. 
Model’s Sensitivity to Non-Segregated Demand and Supply Parameters 
The effects of halving and doubling the base values of elasticities of (total) demand 
for non-segregated soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal are presented in Appendix 
D, Table D.1. Setting ˆUUε =-0.2 for all soybean products in all regions does not change 
production or trade patterns in the free trade equilibrium, nor does it change the fact 
that all regions and the world in general benefit from the RR technology. However, 
compared to the base-values scenario, it changes the distribution of welfare gains be-
tween consumers and producers by increasing consumer benefits and reducing producer 
gains. While in the base-values scenario consumers worldwide received 38 percent of 
the total welfare gain, the halved elasticity would imply that they reaped 49 percent. 
Doubling ˆUUε  for all products in all regions has the opposite effect: consumers in that 
case benefit less than in the base-values scenario (33 percent of the total welfare gain) 
while producers benefit more. The innovator-monopolist’s profit remains essentially 
insensitive to variations in ˆUUε . 
Subjecting the ban scenarios (Scenarios 3 through 6) to the same changes in non-
segregated demand elasticities does not change any conclusions regarding the direction of 
their impact on the four regions. As in the base-values scenario, the ROW still benefits 
from the production ban on RR products, enjoying no segregation costs and hence lower 
conventional prices. Brazilian farmers still benefit from the RR production ban at home, 
but overall, Brazil loses while the ROW gains again thanks to lower conventional prices 
relative to the free trade equilibrium. Simultaneous RR production bans in Brazil and the 
ROW, as well as additional import bans on RR products in the latter region, continue to 
hurt the welfare in regions that initiate them. The distribution of welfare between con-
sumers and producers in these ban scenarios changes in the same manner as in the free 
trade case as demand elasticities are halved and doubled, but the overall region-level re-
sults appear robust. 
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Table D.2 summarizes the adoption and welfare results when the elasticity of land 
supply with respect to soybean prices ψ  is halved or doubled. Doubling ψ  works just the 
opposite of doubling ˆUUε , and the same can be said about halving ψ  versus halving ˆUUε . 
When ψ  is doubled, consumers gain more relative to the pre-innovation benchmark than 
in the base-values scenario and producers gain less, and vice versa when ψ  is halved. 
Innovator-monopolist’s profit shows more sensitivity as supply elasticity changes but is 
still very robust, as its deviation is within 1 percent of the base value. Again, none of the 
qualitative results of the ban scenarios changes.  
The model’s results seem quite sensitive to the change in the yield increase parame-
ter because of the RR technology β . As discussed in Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 
2000, experimental evidence suggests that the RR soybean yields are somewhat lower 
than the yields of their conventional counterparts. However, these results could be im-
pacted by farmers’ economic decisions, or they could be temporarily caused by the fact 
that the RR technology is gradually working its way into better commercial varieties, and 
thus could be misleading. Also, the additive nature of the RR technology gives us reason 
to believe that RR soybeans should potentially outperform conventional varieties thanks 
to better weed management. Indeed, Monsanto has argued that the RR technology gives a 
5 percent yield edge. In what follows, we assume a more moderate yield gain of β =0.02 
(2 percent) and provide results in Table D.3. 
A positive yield gain associated with the RR technology is equivalent to the outward 
supply shift relative to the base-values scenario. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the 
free trade equilibrium with β =0.02, all prices are lower, which leads to the reallocation 
of welfare gains between consumers and producers. In this equilibrium, the United States 
has an 88 percent adoption rate versus 90 percent in the base-values scenario, and all re-
gions benefit from the RR technology. However, while both producers and consumers 
benefited at the world level from the new technology in the base-values scenario, produc-
ers at the world level lose and consumers gain when β =0.02. At the region level,  
Brazilian and U.S. farmers lose by adopting the RR technology.  
This result also applies to all production and import ban scenarios, although overall, 
region-level results of the bans are robust to the increase in the yield parameter. For ex-
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ample, while the ROW still benefits from the home production ban on RR products 
thanks to large consumer benefits, ROW farmers find themselves not only worse off than 
before the ban but also worse off than before the RR technology was adopted. 
To summarize, the sensitivity analysis with respect to the three non-segregated de-
mand and supply parameters shows that the qualitative results and the general model’s 
conclusions for the free trade and all ban scenarios discussed in the previous section are 
robust. What is subject to change is the distribution of welfare between producers and 
consumers. Also, the baseline argument—that in all regions but the United States produc-
ers gain when the RR technology is introduced—is sensitive to the value of yield 
parameter, and the higher value of this parameter may force other regions’ producers to 
lose in equilibrium. What is most robust is the profit of the innovator-monopolist, which 
remains essentially unaffected by these parametric changes. 
Model’s Sensitivity to Differentiated Demand Parameters 
Parameter σˆ  measures the share of demand that is indifferent between the conven-
tional and the RR varieties when the conventional variety’s price is the same as the price 
for the RR (non-segregated) product in the reference year. This indifferent demand can be 
met by consuming either variety. The parameter is used in both the soybean and the soy-
bean oil differentiated demand functions and is set to 0.5 (50 percent) for both products in 
the base-values scenario. In other words, at a particular price level, with prices of both 
varieties the same, 50 percent of consumers demand conventional variety and 50 percent 
are indifferent as to which one to consume.  
This assumption appears to be quite reasonable when applied to the ROW and in par-
ticular to the European Union. A recent survey of 16,000 E.U. citizens (Eurobarometer 
2001) found that 56.5 percent of those questioned believe that GMO-based food is dan-
gerous, while the rest either do not believe so or do not have an opinion. For the purpose 
of the sensitivity analysis, we select alternative values of σˆ =0.333 and σˆ =0.667 (the 
same for soybeans and soybean oil) and report the results in Table D.4.  
As can be seen from the formulas of differentiated demand coefficients provided in 
Appendix B, parameter σˆ  affects slopes and intercepts of both the conventional and RR 
demands. This leads to changes in equilibrium prices and quantities in all scenarios in-
cluding the pre-innovation benchmark simulation, which makes comparisons of RR-
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technology-induced welfare changes between the base-values and alternative-values sce-
narios significant. What is clear in this case, however, is that lower σˆ  increases the 
relative share of the worldwide conventional demand and reduces the share of demand 
for the RR variety, causing higher conventional and lower RR equilibrium prices relative 
to the base-values scenario. Higher σˆ  works in the opposite direction by shrinking the 
size of the market for conventional products and depressing equilibrium conventional 
prices while increasing the RR prices. 
Judging by the free trade results in Table D.4, the Unites States remains the only 
producer of both varieties under different values of σˆ , with an adoption rate of 87 per-
cent at low values and 93 percent at high values. Variation in σˆ  mainly affects the 
welfare of the ROW consumers, causing only a small quantitative and no qualitative 
change in the benefits derived by other agents from the introduction of the RR technol-
ogy. When σˆ  is small, ROW consumers gain 85 percent less than in the base-values 
scenario, and when σˆ  is high, they gain 120 percent more.  
Whereas simulating the RR production ban in the ROW under low σˆ  does not pro-
duce new outcomes, the results for the high σˆ =0.667 suggest that the ROW does not 
benefit from the ban. The low share of GMO-conscious consumers in the region makes 
the ROW production capacity too large for the size of the conventional market. This de-
presses conventional prices to the point where they equal RR prices, and 81 percent of 
indifferent soybean and soybean oil demand at these prices is met by conventional varie-
ties. Although this definitely benefits ROW consumers, it at the same time hurts domestic 
producers to the point where the ban is actually welfare reducing when compared to the 
free trade scenario. 
The RR production ban in Brazil benefits the ROW consumers, too. In addition, as 
the results in previous section show, it benefited Brazilian producers who switched to 
producing the higher-priced conventional variety and benefited from it more than from 
producing less costly but lower-priced RR soybeans in the free trade equilibrium. How-
ever, when σˆ =0.667, this trade-off stops working in their favor and Brazilian farmers 
lose under the production ban at home relative to the no-ban scenario. 
Another situation where the size of the market for conventional products affects the 
baseline result of the model is the simultaneous RR production ban in Brazil and the 
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ROW. Under the base and the high values of σˆ , the world produces more than GMO-
conscious consumers demand in the ROW and therefore a portion of conventional prod-
ucts is used to meet undifferentiated demand in Brazil and indifferent demand in the 
ROW (where conventional and RR prices are equal in equilibrium). This does not happen 
when σˆ =0.333 and the size of the market for conventional products is much larger. In 
this case, the ROW benefits from the ban when compared with the free trade scenario 
because of the combination of favorable conditions under the ban and unfavorable condi-
tions under the free trade equilibrium with its high segregation costs. Brazil and the 
Unites States still lose and Argentina gains as in the base-values scenario. 
Parameter ˆk  is set to 1.05 for both soybean and soybean oil demands in the base-
values scenario, implying that the total demand for each product grows 5 percent as the 
price for the conventional variety falls from the prohibitively high reference year level to 
the RR price level in the same year. The sensitivity analysis reported in Table D.5 looks 
at two reasonable alternative levels of this parameter: ˆk =1.025 and ˆk =1.075. A lower ˆk  
acts as the inward demand shift that lowers all prices (except for meal) in all equilibria, 
while a higher ˆk  acts as the outward demand shift that leads to the increase in soybean 
and soybean oil prices. The changes in the value of parameter ˆk  have some minor quanti-
tative and no qualitative effects on the results of the model. 
The own-price elasticity of conventional demand 00εˆ , evaluated at the reference year 
RR price and the conventional price set to the same value, is assumed to equal -4.5 for 
both soybean and soybean oil demands in the baseline simulations of the model, to reflect 
the notion of close substitutability between the two varieties in the differentiated demand 
system. The two alternative values for this parameter are set to 00εˆ =-3.0 and 00εˆ =-6.0 
(for both soybean and soybean oil demands simultaneously). The model’s sensitivity re-
sults with respect to these values are provided in Table D.6. 
Given that the total soybean and soybean oil demands are inelastic, making conven-
tional demands less own-price elastic translates into lower cross-price elasticity. This 
means less flexibility in the demand system to shift from consuming the conventional 
variety to the RR variety. The opposite is true when the own-price elasticity is increased 
(in absolute value). As a result, the low-elasticity equilibrium is characterized by the rela-
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tively high share of the market for conventional products (13 percent in the free trade 
case), whereas in the high-elasticity equilibrium this share is lower than in the base-
values scenario (2 percent versus 4 percent in the free trade case). Not surprisingly, the 
welfare results of these simulations are very close to those of the low and high values of 
the share parameter σˆ .  
In the free trade equilibrium, the adoption rate in the United States, the only region 
producing both soybean varieties, is 71 percent when 00εˆ =-3.0 compared to the 90 per-
cent rate in the base-values scenario and the 95 percent rate when 00εˆ =-6.0. Similar to 
what we have already seen in the sensitivity analysis for σˆ , the gains to the ROW con-
sumers vary greatly depending on the value of 00εˆ  but remain positive. Also, when the 
ROW bans RR production, it suffers a welfare loss when 00εˆ =-6.0 for the same reasons 
as in the σˆ =0.667 case, albeit prices for the conventional variety now are not as low as 
their RR counterparts but are low enough. Finally, the ROW benefits from the simultane-
ous RR production bans at home and in Brazil when 00εˆ =-3.0 much alike, as in the 
σˆ =0.333 discussion. The innovator-monopolist profit remains robust in all ban scenarios 
but is affected by the low adoption rate in the free trade scenario with low elasticity. 
In summary, differentiated demand parameters σˆ  and 00εˆ  appear to be much more 
crucial in determining the direction of results of several ban scenarios introduced in the 
results section. While the sensitivity analysis confirms that all regions and the world in 
general benefit from the introduction of the RR technology at medium segregation costs, 
the size of the benefit, especially for the ROW consumers, and the level of adoption of 
the RR technology in the free trade scenario are the increasing functions of the (absolute) 
value of either parameter. The conclusion that the ROW benefits from a home production 
ban on RR products is positively related to the equilibrium share of the market for con-
ventional soybean products, which in turn is negatively related to the size of σˆ  and 00εˆ , 
and the same can be said about the benefit of Brazil’s RR production ban for its farmers. 
Also, the ROW may gain from a simultaneous RR production ban at home and in Brazil 
when at least one of the parameters is low. Which of the results is more likely to hold 
clearly can be the subject of speculation in the present environment because differentiated 
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markets for soybean products are in their infancy, but some thoughts on this question will 
be offered in the conclusions. 
Possible Multiple Equilibria and the Effect of Low Brazil-Argentina  
Transportation Costs 
Two additional results that have surfaced in the results discussions are subject to 
change under alternative parametric assumptions. The first one is the uniqueness of the 
market and trade equilibrium described by equations (34)–(46). The segregation cost 
function described by equation (26) creates a nonconvexity in the production space be-
cause of the discontinuity at the point where the region switches between producing no 
RR soybeans and producing some. Specifically, the segregation cost is assumed to be 
zero when only conventional soybeans are produced and a positive constant when at least 
some RR soybean production takes place. Therefore, the uniqueness of equilibrium can-
not be guaranteed. Although neither the baseline nor the sensitivity simulations of the 
model’s scenarios result in more than one equilibrium, taking some parameters to ex-
treme values leads to a multi-equilibrium example. This example appears in Table D.7.  
The two equilibria exist when a no-LDP scenario with the $13.2/mt segregation cost 
is run with unusually low own-price conventional demand elasticity 00εˆ =-1.0. The free 
trade Equilibrium #1 scenario in Table D.7 is characterized by the 61 percent rate of 
adoption of RR technology in the United States and 73 percent in Brazil, with Argentina 
and the ROW specializing in RR production. This equilibrium holds no matter whether 
the discontinuity in the constant $13.2/mt segregation cost is allowed or it is assumed that 
the $13.2/mt cost applies when a region specializes in conventional soybean production. 
Equilibrium #2 is possible only in the former case (the case of this paper). In it, the ROW 
takes advantage of the zero segregation cost in the no-adoption case, enjoys a welfare 
gain over the pre-innovation benchmark, and contributes to a higher worldwide welfare 
gain relative to Equilibrium #1. Equilibrium #2 represents a voluntary welfare-enhancing 
ban on RR production in the ROW. It suggests, at least theoretically, that it is possible 
that a region’s government that pursues protectionist policy can improve its own and the 
world’s welfare by sending the markets on the welfare-enhancing equilibrium path. It 
must be reiterated, however, that it does not happen in this model within the reasonable 
range of parameter values. 
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The second result concerns Scenario 4—the RR production ban in Brazil. The unique 
equilibrium solution for this scenario (see Table C.8) suggests that Brazilian consumers 
demand conventional soybeans and soybean oil despite the fact that they do not have 
differentiated tastes. This is the result of quite high transportation costs between Brazil 
and Argentina that are assumed to be two-thirds of the transportation cost from either 
region to the ROW (Table 6). Because at present large-scale shipments of soybeans and 
soybean products do not take place between Brazil and Argentina, it is difficult to say 
whether these cost estimates are high or low. If they were assumed to be one-fourth of the 
transportation costs between South America and the ROW, the equilibrium results would 
be as shown in Table D.8. 
Table D.8 provides price, production, consumption, and welfare results in this equi-
librium. In the case of low Brazil-Argentina transportation costs and Brazil’s ban on RR 
production, Brazil would consume conventional soybeans but would import the RR vari-
ety from Argentina to meet its soybean oil and meal demands, which will not benefit 
Brazil relative to the high-transportation cost case but will benefit the ROW. The problem 
with this equilibrium lies in the assumption that Brazil runs a zero segregation cost even 
though RR products enter the region, which is unreasonable. In order for the government 
of Brazil to maintain competitive advantage in the conventional soy markets by means of 
the RR production ban and zero segregation cost, it probably should run a concurrent 
consumption (or import) ban on RR products. In the present model, such a consumption 
ban is implicitly imposed by means of (prohibitively) high transportation costs. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have developed a new partial equilibrium, four-region world trade 
model for the soybean complex comprising soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal in 
order to study some of the economic questions arising from the large-scale adoption of 
GM soybeans. The distinctive feature of the model is that consumers in one of the four 
regions—the ROW—view genetically modified RR soybeans, and products derived from 
them, as weakly inferior to their conventional counterparts. The model provides a close 
representation of the world soybean market as it exists today and as it will most likely 
evolve in the near future. Specifically, the model explicitly accounts for the fact that the 
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RR seed is patented and sold worldwide by a U.S. firm at a premium, and that producers 
have to employ a costly segregation technology in order to separate conventional and 
biotech products in the supply chain. Differentiated preferences were introduced into the 
model in a consistent fashion that permits standard welfare calculations. Finally, the 
model is disaggregated just enough to capture individual behavior of the industry’s main 
players and analyze the impact of their policies toward GMOs. The calibrated model was 
solved for equilibrium prices, quantities, production patterns, trade flows, and welfare 
changes under different assumptions regarding market structure, differentiated consumer 
tastes, regional governments’ production and trade policies, and several other supply and 
demand characteristics. Finally, the restrictions on the particular parameter values used at 
the calibration stage were evaluated through an extensive sensitivity analysis. 
Our analysis offers a comprehensive view of the evolution of agricultural biotech-
nology in the soybean complex and begins with the pre-innovation benchmark—the state 
of the world in which the RR technology is not yet available. We show that in the world 
with no feasible segregation technology, the long-run equilibrium state of the world after 
the cost-saving RR technology is introduced is that of complete worldwide adoption. This 
equilibrium is characterized by lower prices for soybeans and soybean products, a con-
tinued U.S. lead in world soybean exports, and welfare gains to all regions and all 
economic agents (producers, consumers, and the innovator-monopolist selling RR seed) 
except U.S. farmers. 
Moving on to the case where segregation technology is available at a positive cost, our 
analysis shows that, absent any government production and trade regulations, the United 
States emerges as the only region producing both RR and conventional soybeans; all other 
regions specialize in RR production. The introduction of the RR technology leads to re-
duced prices for RR products, lower prices for producers of the conventional variety, and 
higher consumption prices of conventional products. Lower segregation costs reduce the 
latter’s price and increase the price received by farmers who grow the conventional variety. 
However, lower segregation costs are associated with more land allocated to growing con-
ventional soybeans, which hurts the profits received by the innovator-monopolist. This 
result is an unwelcome feature for the soybean industry because it implies a conflict of in-
terest between the RR input supplier and farmers who benefit from lower segregation costs. 
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The world in general benefits from using the segregation technology at any feasible cost 
level as GMO-conscious consumers realize their right to choose. 
The analysis shows that an output subsidy received by U.S. farmers, although clearly 
beneficial for them and the region’s consumers, is nevertheless welfare reducing to the 
United States as a whole because of the high cost of the subsidy. The only region that 
gains in this situation is the ROW, but the world in general can potentially benefit from 
this policy as the subsidy works to correct a less-than-optimal adoption of the RR tech-
nology caused by the distorted RR seed prices established by the monopoly. 
The main lesson that is learned from considering what happens when the ROW and 
Brazil impose production bans on RR products is that the ROW has a clear potential to 
benefit from such a ban relative to the no-ban scenario, while in Brazil only farmers can 
take advantage of such regulation. In fact, our results suggest that the ROW should bene-
fit from the ban if segregation costs were medium to high, while Brazilian farmers should 
see welfare gains at all positive levels of segregation costs. These results, however, prove 
to be sensitive to the underlying assumptions about the relative share of the conventional 
soybean market in the ROW, which is affected directly by the share parameter in the ref-
erence year and indirectly by the own-price conventional demand elasticity parameter for 
soybeans and soybean oil. The higher the size of the conventional market and/or the 
lower the elasticity of conventional demands, the more likely the observed gains will 
hold. Also, it is possible that the ROW can gain relative to the no-ban scenario when RR 
production bans are implemented in the two regions simultaneously, although this result 
is not observed at base parameter values. Our analysis also shows that, whenever benefi-
cial to the ROW, production bans reduce U.S. welfare, which justifies the region’s 
concerned position with regard to anti-GMO regulation. Which situation is more likely to 
emerge in reality may be subject to speculation, although the reversal of this paper’s re-
sults requires parameter changes in an unlikely direction of a lower share of GMO-
conscious consumers and/or a higher demand elasticity.  
The last important result of this paper is the robust welfare losses to all regions as the 
result of the introduction of an import ban on RR products in the ROW. Overall, all con-
clusions of the model, except for those mentioned above, prove to be robust to variations 
in critical parameter values. As such, they provide a range of important insights into the 
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channels through which benefits of the current RR technology for the soybean industry 
are derived and explain the possible implications of existing and pending policies pursued 
by the main players in the world soybean complex.
  
Endnotes 
1. A recent survey of a representative sample of 16,000 citizens of the European Union 
overwhelmingly confirms the existence of a potentially sizeable customer base with 
differentiated preferences (Eurobarometer 2001). Fifty-five percent of those polled 
disagree that GM food is not dangerous and 59 percent believe that it can negatively 
impact the environment. Also, 95 percent of the respondents want to have the right 
to choose between biotech and nonbiotech products, which is exactly what the dif-
ferentiated markets will offer. 
 
2. For the purpose of this paper, the Brazil region includes the countries of Brazil and 
Paraguay, while the Argentina region includes all other countries of South America. 
This ensures that the Brazil and Argentina regions cover all of South America. 
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4. Analysis in this section applies to any region. The subscript denoting a region is 
omitted here and elsewhere in this section for notational simplicity. 
 
5. Producers overseas will be hurt by lower world prices but will gain from the tech-
nology spillover, so that the net effect on them is ambiguous. 
 
6. See the section on calibration and Table 6 for more information on price differen-
tials.  
 
7. Here and elsewhere in the text, the elements of the four-dimensional vectors refer to 
the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and the ROW, respectively. 
 
8. This does not contradict some earlier estimates produced by European studies, where 
elevator premiums necessary to cover IP costs for value-added GM soybeans are es-
timated for the United States at $1.80–$3.70/mt, crusher premiums are expected in 
the same range, and refiner-level premiums are at $4.40–$8.80/mt. 
 
9. Here and elsewhere in the text, the term “LDPs” is used to refer to both loan defi-
ciency payments and market loans received by U.S. farmers.  
  
Appendix A: Demand 
 
 
FIGURE A.1. Good Q1 is weakly inferior and Q1 = 0 at p1 = p0  
  
 
 
FIGURE A.2. Good Q1 is weakly inferior and Q1 > 0 at p1 = p0 
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FIGURE A.3. Differentiated demand system where point A satisfies 1 0
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FIGURE A.4. Differentiated demand system where point A satisfies 1 0
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b c b c
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− −
<  
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FIGURE A.5. A general two-good linear demand system 
  
 
 
Appendix B: Demand Calibration 
Solving the system of equations (50)–(54) yields the following calibrated demand 
parameters:  
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The requirements that all parameters are strictly positive, and that cb >0  and cb >1  to 
satisfy curvature conditions, translate into the following restrictions on parameters 
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Given that we estimate that 4.0ˆ
,
−=
UU
ijε  in all regions i and for all products j and assume 
that 05.1ˆ
,
=ijk  and 5.0ˆ , =ijσ  in differentiated markets for soybeans and soybean oil (j = 
B, O), 00
,
ˆ ijε  must satisfy  0ˆ842.8
00
,
<<− ijε . Therefore, for the model that produced results 
shown in Tables C.1–C.15 in Appendix C, we choose the value for 00
,
ˆ ijε  approximately in 
the middle of the interval (B.7), that is at 4.5− .  
It may be instructive to see how this assumption affects the elasticity of scale Tε for 
beans and oil in differentiated markets. Evaluated at ppp ˆ10 == , it equals 
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When 5.4ˆ 00 −=ε  and other parameters are as set above, 4014.0ˆ −=Tε . This 
exercise demonstrates that our differentiated demand system—the way it is calibrated 
here and in the neighborhood of the reference year’s prices and quantities—permits 
sufficiently elastic individual differentiated demands while the total demand remains 
inelastic with respect to uniform changes in both varieties’ prices, similar to current 
behavior of undifferentiated demands for commodity soybeans and oil. 
  
Appendix C.  Results 
TABLE C.1. Economic impact of Roundup Ready technology (no-LDP scenario): 
changes from pre-innovation equilibrium, production, and exports (mil U.S.$; mil mt) 
Soybean Supply Export (Equiv.)a 
 
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
 
M
 
W 
Total Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Export 
Mealb 
Pre-innovation 
US 0.00     70.1 . 26.9 . 2.3 
BR 0.00     35.6 . 18.8 . 5.1 
AR 0.00     21.1 . 15.3 . 0.9 
ROW 0.00     32.3 . -60.9 . -8.3 
No segregation technology 
US 1.00 323 -117 830.8 1036.5 . 69.3 . 24.8 3.2 
BR 1.00 120 72 . 191.7 . 35.9 . 18.6 5.5 
AR 1.00 43 47 . 89.3 . 21.2 . 15.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 125 121 . 246.6 . 32.6 . -58.6 -9.7 
World  611 123 830.8 1564.1      
Segregation cost: $19.8/mt 
US 0.95 310 -95 806.8 1021.2 3.7 65.8 3.7 21.3 3.2 
BR 1.00 116 83 . 199.0 0.0 35.9 0.0 18.6 5.5 
AR 1.00 41 53 . 94.4 0.0 21.3 0.0 15.3 1.0 
ROW 1.00 131 132 . 262.8 0.0 32.6 -3.7 -55.2 -9.7 
World  597 173 806.8 1577.3      
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt 
US 0.90 301 -83 784.4 1002.9 7.0 62.5 7.0 18.1 3.1 
BR 1.00 112 90 . 201.7 0.0 36.0 0.0 18.7 5.5 
AR 1.00 40 57 . 96.9 0.0 21.3 0.0 15.3 1.0 
ROW 1.00 145 138 . 282.7 0.0 32.6 -7.0 -52.0 -9.7 
World  598 201 784.4 1584.2      
Segregation cost: $6.6/mt 
US 0.70 275 -46 690.3 919.1 20.9 48.8 20.9 4.6 2.9 
BR 1.00 97 109 . 206.0 0.0 36.1 0.0 18.9 5.4 
AR 1.00 36 69 . 104.0 0.0 21.3 0.0 15.4 1.0 
ROW 1.00 198 155 . 353.1 0.0 32.7 -20.9 -38.9 -9.2 
World  606 286 690.3 1582.2      
Zero segregation cost 
US 0.62 169 120 651.1 939.8 27.0 43.6 27.0 0.0 2.3 
BR 0.99 116 61 . 176.7 0.3 35.5 0.3 18.3 5.4 
AR 1.00 43 40 . 82.8 0.0 21.2 0.0 15.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 399 111 . 510.9 0.0 32.5 -27.3 -33.5 -8.7 
World  727 332 651.1 1710.2      
aExports of beans, oil, and meal measured in bean equivalent required to support them. This representation is due to the 
model’s inability to distinguish individual trade flows (see eq. (48)). 
bMeal exports, additional to those imbedded in previous two columns. This separate figure arises from the fact that 
domestic crush to meet domestic oil demand usually produces excess domestic supply of meal (see eq. (49)). 
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TABLE C.2. Equilibrium consumption and prices (No-LDP scenario) (mil mt; $/mt) 
Bean Price Oil Price Bean Demand Oil Demand  
Region 
 
 Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Meal 
Price Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Meal 
Demand 
Pre-innovation         
US 0.00 181.9  480.2  143.6 5.4  6.8  27.9 
BR 0.00 171.9  470.2  133.6 1.5  2.8  7.0 
AR 0.00 171.9  470.2  133.6 0.8  0.9  3.0 
ROW 0.00 211.9  540.2  173.6 16.3  13.9  69.8 
             
No segregation technology         
US 1.00  174.5  444.8 142.3  5.5  7.1 28.0 
BR 1.00  164.5  434.8 132.3  1.6  2.8 7.1 
AR 1.00  164.5  434.8 132.3  0.9  0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00  204.5  504.8 172.3  15.7  13.6 70.0 
             
Segregation cost: $19.8/mt         
US 0.95 200.4 174.8 586.7 445.5 142.5 0.0 5.5 0.0 7.1 28.0 
BR 1.00  164.8  435.5 132.5 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.8 7.1 
AR 1.00  164.8  435.5 132.5 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 230.4 204.8 616.4 505.5 172.5 3.7 12.4 0.0 13.6 69.9 
             
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt         
US 0.90 194.0 175.0 551.7 447.0 142.4 0.0 5.5 0.0 7.1 28.0 
BR 1.00  165.0  437.0 132.4 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.8 7.1 
AR 1.00  165.0  437.0 132.4 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 224.0 205.0 611.7 507.0 172.4 4.8 11.3 0.4 13.3 69.9 
             
Segregation cost: $6.6/mt         
US 0.70 187.9 175.5 522.8 454.5 141.4 0.0 5.5 0.0 7.0 28.1 
BR 1.00  165.5  444.5 131.4 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.8 7.1 
AR 1.00  165.5  444.5 131.4 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 217.9 205.5 582.8 514.5 171.4 6.0 10.2 2.7 11.1 70.1 
             
Zero segregation cost         
US 0.62 183.6 177.9 502.9 471.1 140.5 0.0 5.4 0.0 6.9 28.2 
BR 0.99 173.6 164.2 492.9 440.7 130.5 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.8 7.1 
AR 1.00  164.2  440.7 130.5 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 213.6 204.2 562.9 510.7 170.5 6.6 9.8 3.8 10.2 70.2 
Note: Prices are consumer prices; the price received by producers of conventional soybeans is lower by the amount of 
segregation cost. 
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TABLE C.3. Economic impact of Roundup Ready technology (LDP scenario): 
changes from pre-innovation equilibrium, production and exports (mil U.S.$; mil mt) 
Bean Supply 
Export 
(Equiv.)a  
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
 
M
 
in 
Subsidy 
W 
Total Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Export 
Mealb 
Pre-innovationc         
US 0.00      74.0 . 30.3 . 2.3 
BR 0.00      34.4 . 17.5 . 5.2 
AR 0.00      20.5 . 14.6 . 0.9 
ROW 0.00      31.8 . -62.3 . -8.4 
            
No Segregation technology         
US 1.00 478 429 859.4 859.8 906.6 . 75.7 . 30.3 3.2 
BR 1.00 169 -51 . . 117.2 . 34.0 . 16.4 5.6 
AR 1.00 62 -27 . . 35.2 . 20.3 . 14.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 472 7 . . 479.4 . 31.7 . -60.9 -9.9 
World  1181 358 859.4 859.8 1538.3      
         
Segregation cost = $19.8/mt         
US 1.00 461 429 849.7 829.8 909.8 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.4 3.2 
BR 0.91 163 -38 . . 125.4 3.1 31.0 3.1 13.3 5.6 
AR 1.00 60 -19 . . 41.1 0.0 20.3 0.0 14.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 460 20 . . 479.7 0.0 31.8 -3.1 -57.9 -9.9 
World  1144 392 849.7 829.8 1556.0      
         
Segregation cost = $13.2/mt         
US 1.00 455 429 846.0 818.5 911.1 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.4 3.2 
BR 0.87 161 -33 . . 128.5 4.3 29.8 4.3 12.2 5.6 
AR 1.00 59 -16 . . 43.3 0.0 20.3 0.0 14.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 470 25 . . 494.1 0.0 31.8 -4.3 -56.8 -9.9 
World  1144 405 846.0 818.5 1577.0      
         
Segregation cost = $6.6/mt         
US 1.00 428 429 815.5 777.2 895.5 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.6 3.0 
BR 0.60 149 -14 . . 134.6 13.9 20.4 13.9 2.9 5.5 
AR 1.00 55 -4 . . 50.6 0.0 20.4 0.0 14.3 1.0 
ROW 1.00 474 42 . . 516.3 0.0 31.8 -13.9 -47.8 -9.6 
World  1106 452 815.5 777.2 1597.0      
         
Zero segregation cost         
US 1.00 396 429 771.5 726.8 869.5 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.9 2.8 
BR 0.51 129 15 . . 144.3 17.1 17.4 17.1 0.0 5.4 
AR 0.50 50 9 . . 59.3 10.3 10.2 10.3 4.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 552 63 . . 615.2 0.0 31.9 -27.4 -35.0 -9.1 
World  1127 517 771.5 726.8 1688.2      
a
 See footnote a, Table C.1. 
b
 See footnote b, Table C.1. 
c
 The value of the pre-innovation subsidy is $1.2 billion. 
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TABLE C.4. Equilibrium consumption and prices (LDP scenario) (mil mt; $/mt) 
Bean Price Oil Price Bean Demand Oil Demand  
Region 
 
 Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Meal 
Price Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Meal 
Demand 
Pre-innovation         
US 0.00 176.6  468.7  139.5 5.5  6.9  28.2 
BR 0.00 166.6  458.7  129.5 1.6  2.8  7.1 
AR 0.00 166.6  458.7  129.5 0.9  0.9  3.1 
ROW 0.00 206.6  528.7  169.5 16.4  14.1  70.4 
             
No segregation technology         
US 1.00  165.6  425.4 135.5  5.6  7.2 28.5 
BR 1.00  155.6  415.4 125.5  1.6  2.9 7.2 
AR 1.00  155.6  415.4 125.5  0.9  0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00  195.6  485.4 165.5  16.0  13.9 71.0 
             
Segregation cost: $19.8/mt         
US 1.00  166.0  426.3 135.8 0.0 5.6 0.0 7.2 28.5 
BR 0.91 185.3 156.0 578.0 416.3 125.8 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.9 7.2 
AR 1.00  156.0  416.3 125.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 225.3 196.0 599.0 486.3 165.8 3.1 13.1 0.0 13.9 71.0 
             
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt         
US 1.00  166.2  426.6 135.9 0.0 5.6 0.0 7.2 28.5 
BR 0.87 178.8 156.2 541.9 416.6 125.9 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.9 7.2 
AR 1.00  156.2  416.6 125.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 218.8 196.2 599.3 486.6 165.9 4.3 12.1 0.0 13.8 71.0 
             
Segregation cost: $6.6/mt         
US 1.00  166.7  432.0 135.4 0.0 5.6 0.0 7.2 28.5 
BR 0.60 172.8 156.7 510.8 422.0 125.4 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.9 7.2 
AR 1.00  156.7  422.0 125.4 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 212.8 196.7 580.8 492.0 165.4 5.5 11.0 1.5 12.4 71.1 
             
Zero segregation cost         
US 1.00  167.4  439.5 134.5 0.0 5.6 0.0 7.1 28.6 
BR 0.51 167.0 157.6 482.9 430.6 124.5 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.9 7.2 
AR 0.50 167.0 157.4 482.9 429.5 124.5 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 207.0 197.4 552.9 499.5 164.5 6.6 9.9 3.7 10.3 71.2 
Note: Prices are consumer prices.  RR producer prices in the U.S. are $193/mt in all scenarios. The price received by 
producers of conventional soybeans in other regions is lower by the amount of segregation cost. 
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TABLE C.5. Economic impact of loan deficiency payments (changes from no-LDP 
scenario) (mil U.S.$) 
 
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
in 
Subsidy 
W 
Total 
 
No segregation technology 
US 1.00 155 546 28.6 859.8 -129.9 
BR 1.00 49 -123   -74.5 
AR 1.00 19 -74   -54.1 
ROW 1.00 347 -114   232.8 
World  570 235 28.6 859.8 -25.8 
    
Segregation cost: $19.8/mt    
US  151 524 42.9 829.8 -111.4 
BR  47 -121   -73.6 
AR  19 -72   -53.3 
ROW  329 -112   216.9 
World  547 219 42.9 829.8 -21.3 
    
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt    
US  154 512 61.6 818.5 -91.8 
BR  49 -123   -73.2 
AR  19 -73   -53.6 
ROW  325 -113   211.4 
World  546 204 61.6 818.5 -7.2 
    
Segregation cost: $6.6/mt    
US  153 475 125.2 777.2 -23.6 
BR  52 -123   -71.4 
AR  19 -73   -53.4 
ROW  276 -113   163.2 
World  500 166 125.2 777.2 14.8 
    
Zero segregation cost    
US  227 309 120.4 726.8 -70.3 
BR  13 -46   -32.4 
AR  7 -31   -23.5 
ROW  153 -48   104.3 
World  400 185 120.4 726.8 -22.0 
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TABLE C.6. Economic impact of the Roundup Ready production ban in the Rest of 
the World (no-LDP and LDP scenarios), changes from pre-innovation equilibrium, 
production, and exports (mil U.S.$; quantities in mil mt) 
Bean Supply Export (Equiv.)a  
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
in 
Subsidy 
W 
Total Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Export 
Mealb 
No-LDP Scenario 
Segregation cost = positive         
US 1.00 239 9 674.9 0.0 922.2 0.0 70.0 0.0 26.0 2.6 
BR 1.00 81 137 . . 217.7 0.0 36.2 0.0 19.2 5.3 
AR 1.00 30 85 . . 115.6 0.0 21.4 0.0 15.5 1.0 
ROW 0.00 277 41 . . 317.6 32.4 0.0 0.0 -60.7 -8.9 
World  626 272 674.9 0.0 1573.0      
         
Zero segregation cost         
US 0.96 230 22 658.5 0.0 910.5 2.5 67.6 2.5 23.7 2.6 
BR 1.00 77 144 . . 220.8 0.0 36.3 0.0 19.2 5.3 
AR 1.00 29 89 . . 118.4 0.0 21.4 0.0 15.5 1.0 
ROW 0.00 298 10 . . 308.2 32.3 0.0 -2.5 -58.5 -8.8 
World  634 266 658.5 0.0 1557.9      
         
LDP Scenario 
Any segregation cost         
US 1.00 360 429 703.9 665.8 827.2 0.0 75.7 0.0 31.0 2.7 
BR 1.00 119 36 . . 155.5 0.0 34.6 0.0 17.2 5.4 
AR 1.00 45 26 . . 71.1 0.0 20.5 0.0 14.5 1.0 
ROW 0.00 537 -27 . . 510.0 31.7 0.0 0.0 -62.7 -9.0 
World  1061 464 703.9 665.8 1563.7     
aSee footnote a, Table C.1. 
bSee footnote b, Table C.1. 
 
Genetically Modified Crop Innovations and Product Differentiation / 75 
 
TABLE C.7. Economic impact of the Roundup Ready production ban in the Rest of 
the World: (changes from no-ban scenario) (mil U.S.$) 
 No-LDP Scenario LDP Scenario 
 
Region 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
in 
Subsidy 
W 
Total 
          
Segregation cost: $19.8/mt       
US -71 104 -132 -99 -101 0 -146 -164 -83 
BR -35 54  19 -44 74   30 
AR -11 32  21 -15 45   30 
ROW 146 -91  55 77 -47   30 
World 29 99 -132 -4 -83 72 -146 -164 8 
          
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt       
US -62 92 -110 -81 -95 0 -142 -153 -84 
BR -31 47  16 -42 69   27 
AR -10 28  19 -14 42   28 
ROW 132 -97  35 67 -52   16 
World 28 71 -110 -11 -83 59 -142 -153 -13 
          
Segregation cost: $6.6mt       
US -36 55 -15 3 -68 0 -112 -111 -68 
BR -16 28  12 -30 50   21 
AR -6 16  12 -10 30   21 
ROW 79 -114  -36 63 -69   -6 
World 20 -14 -15 -9 -45 12 -112 -111 -33 
          
Zero segregation cost       
US 61 -98 7 -29 -36 0 -68 -61 -42 
BR -39 83  44 -10 21   11 
AR -14 49  36 -5 17   12 
ROW -101 -101  -203 -15 -90   -105 
World -93 -66 7 -152 -66 -53 -68 -61 -125 
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TABLE C.8. Economic impact of the Roundup Ready production ban in Brazil (no-
LDP and LDP scenarios), changes from pre-innovation equilibrium, production and 
exports (mil U.S.$; quantities in mil mt) 
Bean Supply Export (Equiv.)a 
 
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
 
M
 
 in 
Subsidy 
W 
Total Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Export 
Mealb 
No-LDP Scenario 
Segregation cost = $19.8/mt or $13.2/mt        
US 1.00 326 -124 712.4 0.0 914.1 0.0 69.3 0.0 24.8 3.1 
BR 0.00 -94 188 . . 93.1 36.6 0.0 20.4 0.0 4.7 
AR 1.00 43 45 . . 87.2 0.0 21.2 0.0 15.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 291 118 . . 409.2 0.0 32.6 -20.4 -40.0 -8.8 
World  565 226 712.4 0.0 1503.6      
         
Segregation cost = $6.6/mt         
US 0.99 321 -116 706.9 0.0 911.3 0.9 68.5 0.9 24.0 3.1 
BR 0.00 -90 178 . . 87.6 36.6 0.0 20.3 0.0 4.7 
AR 1.00 42 47 . . 88.9 0.0 21.2 0.0 15.3 1.0 
ROW 1.00 289 122 . . 410.5 0.0 32.6 -21.2 -39.2 -8.8 
World  561 230 706.9 0.0 1498.2      
         
Zero segregation cost         
US 0.77 231 23 609.7 0.0 863.4 15.9 54.2 15.9 10.3 2.7 
BR 0.00 -17 12 . . -5.7 35.6 0.0 19.0 0.0 4.9 
AR 1.00 30 90 . . 119.1 0.0 21.4 0.0 15.5 1.0 
ROW 1.00 292 187 . . 479.5 0.0 32.8 -34.9 -25.8 -8.6 
World  536 311 609.7 0.0 1456.2      
         
LDP Scenario 
Segregation cost >=$6.6/mt         
US 1.00 511 429 746.6 917.7 768.5 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.3 3.2 
BR 0.00 -61 81 . . 19.2 34.9 0.0 18.5 0.0 4.7 
AR 1.00 66 -42 . . 23.7 0.0 20.2 0.0 14.1 1.0 
ROW 1.00 686 -17 . . 669.0 0.0 31.6 -18.5 -44.3 -9.0 
World  1201 451 746.6 917.7 1480.4      
            
Zero Segregation Cost         
US 1.00 421 429 715.3 766.5 798.5 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.7 2.9 
BR 0.00 -21 -3 . . -23.6 34.4 0.0 17.7 0.0 4.9 
AR 0.52 54 -2 . . 52.2 9.8 10.6 9.8 4.6 1.0 
ROW 1.00 597 46 . . 643.5 0.0 31.8 -27.5 -35.2 -8.8 
World  1051 471 715.3 766.5 1470.7      
aSee footnote a, Table C.1. 
bSee footnote b, Table C1. 
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TABLE C.9. Economic impact of the Roundup Ready production ban in Brazil: 
(changes from no-ban scenario) (mil U.S.$) 
 No-LDP Scenario  LDP Scenario 
 
Region 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total 
 CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
 in 
Subsidy 
W 
Total 
           
Segregation cost: $19.8/mt        
US 16 -29 -94 -107  50 0 -103 88 -141 
BR -210 105  -106  -224 119   -106 
AR 2 -8  -7  6 -23   -17 
ROW 160 -14  146  226 -37   189 
World -32 53 -94 -74  57 59 -103 88 -76 
           
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt        
US 25 -41 -72 -89  56 0 -99 99 -143 
BR -206 98  -109  -222 114   -109 
AR 3 -12  -10  7 -26   -20 
ROW 146 -20  127  216 -42   175 
World -33 25 -72 -81  57 46 -99 99 -97 
           
Segregation cost: $6.6mt        
US 46 -70 17 -8  83 0 -69 141 -127 
BR -187 69  -118  -210 95   -115 
AR 6 -22  -15  11 -38   -27 
ROW 91 -33  57  212 -59   153 
World -45 -56 17 -84  95 -1 -69 141 -117 
           
Zero segregation cost        
US 62 -97 -41 -76  25 0 -56 40 -71 
BR -133 -49  -182  -150 -18   -168 
AR -13 50  36  4 -11   -7 
ROW -107 76  -31  45 -17   28 
World -191 -21 -41 -254  -76 -46 -56 40 -218 
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TABLE C.10. Economic impact of the simultaneous Roundup Ready production bans in 
Brazil and the Rest of the World (no-LDP and LDP scenarios), changes from pre-
innovation equilibrium, production and exports (mil U.S.$; quantities in mil mt) 
Bean Supply Export (Equiv.)a  
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
 in 
Subsidy 
W 
Total Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Export 
Mealb 
No-LDP Scenario 
Any segregation cost         
US 1.00 113 215 563.6 0.0 890.9 0.0 71.1 0.0 27.6 2.3 
BR 0.00 35 -96 . . -60.7 35.0 0.0 18.1 0.0 5.2 
AR 1.00 14 148 . . 162.1 0.0 21.7 0.0 15.9 0.9 
ROW 0.00 271 -87 . . 183.4 32.0 0.0 -18.1 -43.5 -8.4 
World  432 180 563.6 0.0 1175.7      
         
LDP Scenario 
Any segregation cost         
US 1.00 158 429 591.6 313.6 865.4 0.0 75.7 0.0 31.7 2.3 
BR 0.00 49 -128 . . -78.8 33.6 0.0 16.5 0.0 5.2 
AR 1.00 19 122 . . 141.9 0.0 21.1 0.0 15.1 0.9 
ROW 0.00 379 -119 . . 260.5 31.4 0.0 -16.5 -46.8 -8.4 
World  606 305 591.6 313.6 1188.9      
aSee footnote a, Table C.1. 
bSee footnote b, Table C.1. 
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TABLE C.11. Economic impact of the simultaneous Roundup Ready production bans 
in Brazil and the Rest of the World (changes from no-ban scenario) (mil U.S.$) 
 No-LDP Scenario  LDP Scenario 
 
Region 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total  
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
 in 
Subsidy 
W 
Total 
           
Segregation cost: $19.8/mt        
US -197 310 -243 -130  -303 0 -258 -516 -44 
BR -81 -179  -260  -114 -90   -204 
AR -27 95  68  -41 141   101 
ROW 140 -219  -79  -81 -139   -219 
World -165 7 -243 -402  -538 -87 -258 -516 -367 
           
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt        
US -188 298 -221 -112  -297 0 -254 -505 -46 
BR -77 -186  -262  -112 -95   -207 
AR -26 91  65  -40 138   99 
ROW 126 -225  -99  -91 -144   -234 
World -166 -21 -221 -409  -538 -100 -254 -505 -388 
           
Segregation cost: $6.6mt        
US -162 261 -127 -28  -270 0 -224 -464 -30 
BR -62 -205  -267  -100 -114   -213 
AR -22 79  58  -36 126   91 
ROW 73 -242  -170  -95 -161   -256 
World -174 -106 -127 -407  -500 -147 -224 -464 -408 
           
Zero segregation cost        
US -56 95 -88 -49  -238 0 -180 -413 -4 
BR -81 -157  -237  -80 -143   -223 
AR -29 108  79  -31 113   83 
ROW -128 -198  -328  -173 -182   -355 
World -295 -152 -88 -535  -521 -212 -180 -413 -499 
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TABLE C.12. Economic impact of the Roundup Ready production and import ban in 
the Rest of the World (no-LDP scenario), changes from pre-innovation equilibrium, 
production and exports (mil U.S.$; quantities in mil mt) 
Soybean Supply Export (Equiv.)a  
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Export 
Mealb 
Segregation cost: $19.8/mt 
US 0.67 429 -256 396.3 569.6 23.0 45.6 23.0 0.0 4.3 
BR 0.52 245 -130  115.3 16.7 18.1 16.7 0.0 6.2 
AR 0.30 83 -77  6.6 14.4 6.2 14.4 0.0 1.3 
ROW 0.00 -1487 533  -954.1 33.8 0.0 -54.0 0.0 -11.8 
World  -730 71 396.3 -262.6      
 
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt 
US 0.65 353 -149 391.2 594.5 24.1 45.1 24.1 0.0 3.8 
BR 0.51 208 -76  132.0 17.2 17.8 17.2 0.0 6.0 
AR 0.30 72 -45  27.0 14.6 6.2 14.6 0.0 1.2 
ROW 0.00 -1021 363  -658.2 33.3 0.0 -56.0 0.0 -11.0 
World  -389 93 391.2 95.4      
 
Segregation cost: $6.6/mt 
US 0.64 277 -40 386.1 622.8 25.3 44.5 25.3 0.0 3.2 
BR 0.50 171 -21  150.6 17.8 17.6 17.8 0.0 5.8 
AR 0.29 61 -12  48.4 14.9 6.1 14.9 0.0 1.1 
ROW 0.00 -552 196  -355.5 32.9 0.0 -57.9 0.0 -10.1 
World  -43 123 386.1 466.3      
 
Zero segregation cost 
US 0.62 202 71 381.0 654.6 26.4 43.9 26.4 0.0 2.7 
BR 0.49 135 36 . 171.0 18.3 17.4 18.3 0.0 5.5 
AR 0.28 49 21 . 70.7 15.1 6.0 15.1 0.0 1.0 
ROW 0.00 -79 33 . -46.2 32.4 0.0 -59.9 0.0 -9.3 
World  307 162 381.0 850.1      
aSee footnote a, Table C.1. 
bSee footnote b, Table C.1. 
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TABLE C.13. Economic impact of the simultaneous Roundup Ready production bans 
in Brazil and the Rest of the World and import ban in the Rest of the World (no-
LDP scenario), changes from pre-innovation equilibrium, production and exports 
(mil U.S.$; quantities in mil mt) 
Soybean Supply Export (Equiv.)a  
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Export 
Mealb 
Segregation cost: $19.8/mt 
US 0.70 638 -569 343.5 413.2 20.3 46.5 20.3 0.0 4.9 
BR 0.00 -178 422  244.0 37.9 0.0 21.9 0.0 4.5 
AR 0.32 111 -171  -59.4 13.7 6.4 13.7 0.0 1.3 
ROW 0.00 -1069 378  -691.3 33.4 0.0 -56.0 0.0 -10.8 
World  -497 60 343.5 -93.6      
 
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt 
US 0.67 498 -371 337.4 464.3 22.3 45.7 22.3 0.0 4.2 
BR 0.00 -124 284  160.1 37.1 0.0 21.0 0.0 4.7 
AR 0.31 92 -112  -20.0 14.2 6.2 14.2 0.0 1.3 
ROW 0.00 -727 256  -471.3 33.0 0.0 -57.4 0.0 -10.2 
World  -261 57 337.4 133.1      
 
Segregation cost: $6.6/mt 
US 0.65 359 -166 331.3 523.6 24.2 44.9 24.2 0.0 3.5 
BR 0.00 -70 152  81.1 36.4 0.0 20.0 0.0 4.8 
AR 0.30 72 -50  21.8 14.6 6.1 14.6 0.0 1.2 
ROW 0.00 -388 137  -251.0 32.7 0.0 -58.8 0.0 -9.6 
World  -28 72 331.3 375.4      
 
Zero segregation cost 
US 0.63 219 47 325.1 591.1 26.1 44.1 26.1 0.0 2.9 
BR 0.00 -17 24 . 6.9 35.7 0.0 19.1 0.0 5.0 
AR 0.29 52 14 . 66.0 15.1 6.0 15.1 0.0 1.1 
ROW 0.00 -52 21 . -30.6 32.4 0.0 -60.3 0.0 -8.9 
World  203 106 325.1 633.5      
aSee footnote a, Table C.1. 
bSee footnote b, Table C.1. 
82 / Sobolevsky, Moschini, and Lapan 
 
TABLE C.14. Economic Impact of the simultaneous production and import bans  
(no-LDP scenario), changes from no-ban scenario (mil U.S.$) 
 
RR Production and Import Ban in 
the ROW  
RR Production Bans in Brazil and ROW 
and Import Ban in ROW 
 
Region 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total  
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total 
          
Segregation cost: $19.8/mt       
US 119 -161 -411 -452  328 -474 -463 -608 
BR 129 -213  -84  -294 339  45 
AR 42 -130  -88  70 -224  -154 
ROW -1618 401  -1217  -1200 246  -954 
World -1327 -102 -411 -1840  -1094 -113 -463 -1671 
          
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt       
US 52 -66 -393 -408  197 -288 -447 -539 
BR 96 -166  -70  -236 194  -42 
AR 32 -102  -70  52 -169  -117 
ROW -1166 225  -941  -872 118  -754 
World -987 -108 -393 -1489  -859 -144 -447 -1451 
          
Segregation cost: $6.6mt       
US 2 6 -304 -296  84 -120 -359 -396 
BR 74 -130  -55  -167 43  -125 
AR 25 -81  -56  36 -119  -82 
ROW -750 41  -709  -586 -18  -604 
World -649 -163 -304 -1116  -634 -214 -359 -1207 
          
Zero segregation cost       
US 33 -49 -270 -285  50 -73 -326 -349 
BR 19 -25  -6  -133 -37  -170 
AR 6 -19  -12  9 -26  -17 
ROW -478 -78  -557  -451 -90  -542 
World -420 -170 -270 -860  -524 -226 -326 -1077 
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TABLE C.15. Economic impact of Roundup Ready technology in alternative market 
structures (no-LDP scenario), changes from pre-innovation and ={0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2} 
equilibria (mil U.S.$) 
  Vs. Pre-Innovation Equilibrium  Vs.  = {0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2} Equilibrium 
 
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total  
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total 
Markup µ = {0,0,0,0} 
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt; free trade 
US 0.95 459 141 0.0 600.4  158 224 -784 -402.5 
BR 1.00 162 74 . 236.7  50 -16  35.0 
AR 1.00 59 50 . 109.0  19 -7  12.1 
ROW 1.00 481 179 . 659.6  336 41  376.9 
World  1162 443 0.0 1605.7  564 242 -784 21.5 
           
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt; RR production bans in BR and ROW 
US 1.00 214 536 0.0 750.4  101 321 -564 -140.5 
BR 0.00 66 -180 . -113.6  31 -84  -52.9 
AR 1.00 26 168 . 194.7  12 20  32.6 
ROW 0.00 514 -165 . 349.5  243 -78  166.1 
World  822 359 0.0 1181.0  390 179 -564 5.3 
           
Markup µ = {0.4,0.4,0.4,0.4} 
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt; free trade 
US 0.90 247 8 1133.4 1387.8  -54 91 349 384.9 
BR 1.00 95 18 . 113.4  -17 -72  -88.3 
AR 1.00 33 14 . 46.6  -7 -43  -50.3 
ROW 1.00 17 18 . 35.0  -128 -120  -247.7 
World  392 58 1133.4 1582.8  -206 -143 349 -1.4 
           
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt; RR production bans in BR and ROW 
US 1.00 100 236 635.1 971.4  -13 21 72 80.5 
BR 0.00 31 -85 . -54.0  -4 11  6.7 
AR 1.00 12 82 . 94.7  -2 -66  -67.4 
ROW 0.00 240 -78 . 162.9  -31 9  -20.5 
World  384 156 635.1 1174.9  -48 -24 72 -0.8 
           
Monopolist profit maximizing markup; RR production bans in BR and ROW 
Segregation cost: $13.2/mt; markup µ = {1.498,0.0,0.2,0.0} 
US 1.00 -149 -655 1794.4 990.4  -262 -870 1231 99.5 
BR 0.00 -46 129 . 83.3  -81 225  144.0 
AR 1.00 -18 287 . 269.0  -32 139  106.9 
ROW 0.00 -357 117 . -240.4  -628 204  -423.8 
World  -571 -122 1794.4 1102.2  -1003 -302 1231 -73.5 
           
Zero segregation cost; markup µ = {0.733,0.0,0.2,0.0} 
US 1.00 36 -61 955.6 931.3  -77 -276 392 40.4 
BR 0.00 11 -31 . -19.7  -24 65  41.0 
AR 1.00 4 188 . 192.8  -10 40  30.7 
ROW 0.00 87 -28 . 58.7  -184 59  -124.7 
World  139 69 955.6 1163.1  -293 -111 392 -12.6 
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TABLE D.3. Model’s sensitivity to the yield increase parameter : welfare 
effects (mil U.S.$) 
 Base Values   = 0.02 
 
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total  
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total 
Free Trade 
US 0.90 301 -83 784 1003  0.88 411 -288 770 893 
BR 1.00 112 90  202  1.00 146 -6  140 
AR 1.00 40 57  97  1.00 53 3  56 
ROW 1.00 145 138  283  1.00 409 51  459 
World  598 201 784 1584   1019 -240 770 1548 
 
RR Production Ban in ROW 
US 1.00 239 9 675 922  1.00 333 -171 669 832 
BR 1.00 81 137  218  1.00 110 55  165 
AR 1.00 30 85  116  1.00 42 39  81 
ROW 0.00 277 41  318  0.00 498 -28  470 
World  626 272 675 1573   984 -105 669 1547 
 
RR Production Ban in Brazil 
US 1.00 326 -124 712 914  1.00 419 -300 707 825 
BR 0.00 -94 188  93  0.00 -69 115  46 
AR 1.00 43 45  87  1.00 54 -1  53 
ROW 1.00 291 118  409  1.00 507 44  551 
World  565 226 712 1504   910 -142 707 1476 
 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW 
US 1.00 113 215 564 891  1.00 180 82 561 823 
BR 0.00 35 -96  -61  0.00 56 -153  -97 
AR 1.00 14 148  162  1.00 22 116  138 
ROW 0.00 271 -87  183  0.00 432 -139  293 
World  432 180 564 1176   690 -94 561 1157 
 
RR Prod. and Import Ban in ROW 
US 0.65 353 -149 391 595  0.65 392 -239 386 539 
BR 0.51 208 -76  132  0.50 223 -122  101 
AR 0.30 72 -45  27  0.30 79 -71  7 
Note: Assuming the $13.2/mt segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario. 
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TABLE D.7. Possibility of multiple equilibria when demand elasticity ˆ00  = –1.0: 
welfare changes from pre-innovation equilibrium, production, and exports (mil 
U.S.$; quantities in mil mt) 
Soybean 
Supply 
Export 
(Equiv.)a  
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Export 
Mealb 
Pre-innovation 
US 0.00     70.3  27.5  1.8 
BR 0.00     35.7  19.1  5.0 
AR 0.00     21.1  15.4  0.9 
ROW 0.00     32.4  -62.0  -7.6 
           
Equilibrium #1 
US 0.61 186 95 619.6 900.6 27.4 43.4 27.4 0.0 2.1 
BR 0.73 126 48  174.7 9.7 26.2 9.7 9.1 5.3 
AR 1.00 45 33  78.2 0.0 21.2 0.0 15.3 1.0 
ROW 1.00 -184 100  -84.3 0.0 32.6 -37.0 -24.4 -8.4 
World  173 276 619.6 1069.2      
 
Equilibrium #2 
US 0.92 304 -96 635.9 843.8 5.3 64.5 5.3 20.5 2.5 
BR 1.00 108 83  191.3 0.0 36.1 0.0 19.0 5.3 
AR 1.00 39 53  92.8 0.0 21.3 0.0 15.4 0.9 
ROW 0.00 -133 389  256.5 33.5 0.0 -5.3 -55.0 -8.7 
World  319 429 635.9 1384.4      
Note: Assuming the $13.2/mt segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario. 
aSee footnote a, Table C.1, Appendix C. 
bSee footnote b, Table C.1, Appendix C. 
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TABLE D.8. Model’s sensitivity to transportation costs between Argentina and Brazil: 
welfare changes from pre-innovation equilibrium, quantities and prices (millions of 
U.S.$) 
Soybean 
Supply 
Export 
(Equiv.)a  
Region 
 
 
CS 
Total 
PS 
Total 
M
 
W 
Total Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Export 
Mealb 
US 1.00 236 13 718.7 967.1 0.0 70.1 0.0 26.1 2.6 
BR 0.00 -49 18  -31.0 35.7 0.0 34.1 -15.2 0.0 
AR 1.00 30 86  116.0 0.0 21.4 0.0 15.5 6.3 
ROW 1.00 300 182  482.0 0.0 32.8 -34.1 -26.4 -8.8 
World  516 299 718.7 1534.1      
 
 Bean Price Oil Price Meal Bean Demand Oil Demand 
 Conv. RR Conv. RR Price Conv. RR Conv. RR 
Meal 
Demand 
US 182.5 176.4 496.1 462.5 140.7 0.0 5.5 0.0 7.0 28.1 
BR 172.5 176.4 486.1 470.0 140.7 1.5 0.0 0.0 2.8 6.9 
AR 172.5 166.4 486.1 452.5 130.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 212.5 206.4 556.1 522.5 170.7 7.1 9.2 4.9 9.0 70.2 
Notes: Transportation costs assume transportation cost 1 1 1
, , ,
10, 17.5, 10B AZ O AZ M AZt t t= = = . Prices assume the 
$13.2/mt segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario. 
aSee footnote a, Table C.1, Appendix C. 
bSee footnote b, Table C.1, Appendix C. 
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